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1 Introduction
Thinking about international trade and trade policy is typically based on models that as-
sume perfectly and costlessly enforced property rights. Especially in transnational settings,
however, where there is no ultimate authority to enforce property rights, countries expend
resources on their defense and diplomacy in order to secure their borders and interests or, to
put it differently, to self-enforce their property rights. As amply demonstrated in Findlay’s
and O’Rourke’s (2007) overview of Eurasia’s economic history, military competition for re-
sources and the expansion of world trade were inextricably linked over the whole of the past
millennium. Similarly, for all of its recorded history in the Meditarranean sea, trade could
not conceivably be divorced from costly security considerations (Abulafia, 2013). While
interstate wars have become less common in the post-World War II period than they had
been in the thirty years prior to that, there have been both enough of them and, more
seriously, enough disputes to keep almost all countries armed. Examples of hot disputes in
the postwar period include the Suez Canal crisis in the 1950s, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait that
resulted in the first Gulf war in the early 1990s, and the Kashmir dispute between India
and Pakistan. Numerous other disputes—from that over the Spratly and Paracel islands
in the South China Sea, to disputes over water (e.g., flowing through rivers like the Nile
and the Brahmaputra), and to others involving oil, minerals, or simply land—might have
not resulted in hot wars; however, they keep the militaries of almost all countries busy.1
Moreover, the direct and indirect costs of such disputes are large. For example, the latest
estimates of the costs of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars to the United States are around 4
to 6 trillion dollars (Stiglitz and Bilmes, 2012).2
The quantitative importance of security costs naturally raises questions as to how in-
terstate disputes over resources matter for trade openness and vice versa. More specifically,
how do different trade regimes (e.g., autarky and free trade) affect the extent to which pro-
ductive resources are diverted into arming? Recognizing that security policies themselves
are trade-regime dependent, what is the relationship between trade openness and welfare?
Is free trade an equilibrium policy? And, if it is, what are its implications for the direction
and volume of trade flows?
In general, there are two channels through which trade openness in the presence of
insecurity could matter for the allocation of productive resources. First, a switch from
1See, Klare (2001), for an overview and many examples.
2Military expenditures alone were about 2.6 percent of world GDP during 2004, varying from less than
1 percent for a few countries to more than 10 percent for Saudi Arabia (SIPRI, 2005). To get some sense of
the overall costs of conflict (including civil war), Blomberg and Hess (2012) estimate a lower bound for the
yearly cost of conflict of 9 percent of steady state consumption for the 1950 to 2004 period. For high-income
countries like the United States and France, the cost was roughly 4.5 percent of consumption, whereas for
Iraq and Iran, largely as a result of the war between them, it was nearly 77 percent and 16 percent of their
respective yearly consumptions.
autarky to free trade alters product prices and thus factor prices, and thereby influences
the relative costs of employing productive resources for arming purposes. Second, product
prices and thus the terms of trade could themselves depend on security policies; this feedback
channel would also be relevant for the determination of security policies and more generally
the allocation of productive resources.
In this paper, we aim to address the questions identified above, emphasizing the first
of these two channels that highlights the role of endogenous factor prices. Specifically, our
analysis builds on a modified version of the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model of trade,
focusing on the case of two small countries (i.e., countries having no influence on the world
price) that possibly trade with the “rest of the world,” which we treat as exogenous.3 The
model is augmented to allow for insecurity—more precisely, conflict between the two small
countries over a resource—and its accompanying costs. The neoclassical model (which we
also call the “Nirvana” model, to use Demsetz’s (1969) apt term) is a limiting case of our
model when security is costless and perfect.
In the model, one factor of production (“labor”) is perfectly secure, while the other
(“land”) is, in part, insecure. The distribution of insecure land between the two countries
depends on the relative amount of arming by each. Arming itself is produced with the
two factors of production and the cost of its production represents security costs. A key
feature of this framework is that it captures the trade-regime dependence of the net marginal
benefit of arming and thus of the incentive to arm. With arming endogenous, the factor
endowments left over for use in civilian production of the two final goods are also endogenous
and depend on the trade regime prevailing in the two countries. Thus, both security costs
and the factor endowments used in civilian production are endogenous to the prevailing
trade regime. The two trade regimes we consider and compare are autarky and free trade.
Our comparison of welfare under these two regimes shows that the relative factor in-
tensities of the two civilian goods play an important role. For example, when the countries
are identical and they both import the land-intensive good under free trade, free trade is
superior to autarky for both countries. In this case, because the good produced intensively
with the contested resource can be obtained more cheaply in world markets than it could
be produced domestically under autarky, free trade reduces the incentive to arm and thus
the security costs relative to the autarkic outcome. Therefore, free trade is better due to
both the traditional gains from trade and the lower costs of security. However, when both
countries export the land-intensive good, they might very well prefer autarky. In particular,
3As noted below, we view the large-country case where the second channel comes into play as important.
Although such an analysis is beyond the scope of the present paper, we are exploring, in ongoing research,
the consequences of insecure resources in a Ricardian model with a non-traded goods sector, to capture both
factor-price effects and product-price effects. The results in that setting, however, are qualitatively similar
to what we find in the present paper that focuses solely on the consequences of factor-price effects.
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the higher export price compared with the price of the good under autarky makes compe-
tition over land more intense, thereby increasing the costs of security. Of course, a higher
export price also brings gains from trade. But, for export prices not too high, these gains
are outweighed by the increased security costs, to render autarky preferable to free trade.
More generally, the two trading regimes considered induce very different security costs.
Under autarky, these costs depend on the domestic factor and goods prices in both countries,
whereas under free trade they tend to be equalized across countries because of factor price
equalization. Autarky will be preferable for one or both countries when free trade involves
higher added security costs relative to the gains from trade.
These results might be taken to imply that adversarial countries would choose to impose
barriers to trade for those world prices that make autarky preferable to free trade for both
countries. However, an extended analysis of the model to consider the non-cooperative
choice of trade regimes by two identical countries shows that free trade is always a subgame
perfect equilibrium for such world prices; and, for a subset of those prices, it is the unique,
dominant-strategy equilibrium, thus leading to a prisoner’s dilemma outcome. By the same
token, in the presence of resource insecurity and the absence of institutions to deal with it,
“cooperation” in the form of freer trade policies can lead to perverse outcomes and alone
cannot address the fundamental problem at hand. That is to say, realizing the gains from
free trade requires that the problem of resource insecurity be addressed.
We also identify two ways in which the distortion induced by resource insecurity man-
ifests itself in a country’s comparative advantage. First, simply through its absorption of
secure labor and land resources into the production of guns, resource insecurity can cause
trade patterns to differ sharply from those predicted by traditional analyses that abstract
from conflict. More specifically, there exists a range of world prices of the consumption
good produced intensively with the contested resource, depending on the factor intensity of
guns production, for which a country’s trade with the rest of the world moves in the oppo-
site direction of that which would be observed under Nirvana. Second, the introduction of
free trade in consumption goods changes arming incentives along with the mix of resources
absorbed in arming and thus the resources left for the production of consumption goods,
thereby making the distortion of insecurity on resource allocation trade-regime dependent.
As such, a country’s true comparative advantage (given insecurity) can differ from that
which is implied by a simple comparison of autarkic prices to world prices. Both of these
influences imply that the presence of insecurity plays an important role in the determination
of a country’s actual trade patterns that traditional approaches fail to capture.
Our substantive characterization results do not depend on specific functional forms
of production or utility functions. The resulting generalized treatment sets the stage for
applications and extensions of the basic model to settings in which insecure property rights
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figure prominently in world affairs. In particular, such applications and extensions can
provide new insight into the relationship between trade and security policies of adversaries
and allies, which is of great relevance to the fields of international relations and international
political economy.
While we view the insights of our model as applying more generally to conditions of
transnational disputes, the model fits best small neigboring countries that face significant
resource contestation.4 One example concerns the countries along the Nile river, as discussed
by Klare (2001). The economy of Egypt critically depends on the Nile flowing at the rate
that it has flowed for millennia, and given Egypt’s population growth that dependence is
not likely to fall in the foreseeable future. The countries located upstream—i.e., Burundi,
Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and, most recently, South
Sudan—are poorer than Egypt; and, for at least for some of them, using the Nile for power-
generation and irrigation will be a key factor in their economic development. Of course, such
use of the Nile by these upstream countries would reduce the flow to Egypt and thus cause
serious harm to that economy. Indeed, when Ethiopia, with the help of the World Bank, was
drawing plans to build dams in its territory, Egypt credibly threatened to destroy the dams
using its air force. Debates over the usage of the Nile’s water remain largely unresolved,
with significant implications having both security and economic dimensions.5 The value of
water to Egypt and the other up-stream countries depends not only on its importance as
a basic need of life that is expected to rise as the populations of these countries continue
to grow. It also depends on the degree of trade openness in these countries and the prices
of traded goods that use water intensively as an input. For example, the world price of
Egyptian cotton, a good that uses water as a main input, affects the value of the Nile’s
water flow to Egypt.
Another factor input that has taken center stage in a number of disputes is oil. As the
price of oil has increased over the past decade, so too have interstate tensions, resulting
in hot incidents in areas with proven or suspected reserves. Recently, the Chinese and
Vietnamese navies exchanged water cannon fire over a disputed area where China had
brought an oil rig for installation.6 This exchange follows other incidents involving Chinese
and Philippine vessels, and can be viewed as part of a larger ongoing dispute over islets
in the South China Sea that involves numerous other countries (including Taiwan, Brunei,
4See Caselli et al. (2013) for an analysis of the importance of geography in the emergence of conflict over
resources as well as in trade patterns. Our analysis takes the insecurity of resources and thus conflict as
given, though the degree of conflict depends endogenously on product prices.
5Although the risk of war over the Nile appears to have abated since Klare’s writing, tensions have flared
up recently as Ethiopia has made significant progress in constructing its self-financed Grand Renaissance
Dam (to be completed in 2017). See, for example, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26679225.
6See, for example, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/08/world/asia/philippines-detains-crew-of-chinese-
fishing-vessel.html.
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Indonesia, and Malaysia). A similar dispute having oil as its main ingredient revolves
around the delineation of exploitation rights in the Caspian Sea (involving Russia, Iran,
Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan).7
This paper’s contribution is related to literatures in both political science and economics.
Political scientists have long been interested in the linkages between international trade and
conflict.8 Economists, by contrast, have only begun to explore these linkages. Examples
include Anderson and Marcouiller (2005) and Anderton et al. (1999), who analyze Ricardian
models in which traded goods are insecure either because of the presence of pirates and
bandits or because the contending sides influence the terms of trade through arming. Both
approaches emphasize the important, though basic, point that international trade can be
hampered by the anarchic nature of international relations. Skaperdas and Syropoulos
(2001, 2002) address some of the implications of insecure property in the context of simple
exchange models. Acemoglu et al. (2012) explore the implications for intertemporal pricing
and the exhaustion of a contested resource in a dynamic setting. Martin et al. (2008) also
consider the linkages between conflict and international trade, but they take a very different
approach, one that abstracts from arming decisions and the endogenous determination of
security costs, emphasizing instead the role of expanded multilateral trade opportunities in
possibly creating an environment that is more conducive to bilateral conflict.
While extant trade theory has ruled out security problems by assumption, there are some
exceptions that focus on the related problem of open-access resources. Chichilnisky (1994)
argues that trade can reduce welfare in the South by accentuating the over-exploitation
of an open-access resource in which it has a comparative advantage,9 and Brander and
Taylor (1997a) formally prove this idea. Hotte et al. (2000) also study the effects of trade
in an open-access resource and extend the analysis to consider the evolution of private
enforcement in dynamic environments. Margolis and Shogren (2002) consider a North-
South trade model with enclosures. The key difference between these models and ours is
that enforcement costs are due to the active contestation of resources.
In the next section, we present the formal model and a preliminary analysis that proves
7As one observer notes, “The Caspian Sea, once a strategic backwater, is quickly becoming a tinder-
box of regional rivalries—all fueled by what amounts to trillions in petrodollars beneath its waves.” See
http://www.npr.org/2012/06/25/155698857/foreign-policy-the-great-caspian-arms-race.
8See Barbieri and Schneider (1999), who survey much of the theoretical and empirical literatures on the
subject. Many of the analyses, in contrast to ours, emphasize the aggregate income effects of trade, with
the gains of trade reflected in higher incomes that tend to amplify incentives to arm. Rowe (1999, 2005) is,
to our knowledge, the sole political scientist who emphasizes the role of factor endowments. Although he
does so in a qualitative fashion (focusing on military costs, while effectively abstracting from the potential
benefits of security policies), his analysis of how globalization in the late 1800s and early 1900s set the stage
for World War I points to the importance of the mechanism highlighted in our study—namely, the link
between product and factor prices that determines the costs of security.
9Her analysis also points to the importance of open-access resources for the pattern of trade.
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useful in subsequent sections. In Section 3, we investigate optimal security policies under
autarky and free trade. Then, in Section 4, we explore the implications of international
conflict for trade patterns and trade volumes. A comparison between autarky and free
trade in terms of their implications for security costs and welfare follows in Section 5.
Section 6 examines the strategic considerations that come into play in the non-cooperative
choice of trade regimes by each country. Lastly, in Section 7, we offer several concluding
comments. Technical details have been relegated to Appendix A and to a supplementary
appendix available online, Appendix B.
2 Framework and Preliminary Analysis
Consider a global economy that consists of two countries, indexed by i = 1, 2, and the
rest of the world (ROW), which for simplicity is treated as a single entity and taken as
exogenous. Each country can produce two consumption goods (say “butter” and “oil”),
indexed by j = 1, 2, using labor and land under constant returns to scale. In the spirit
of the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) trade model and as a benchmark, we assume
the countries have access to the same production technology; consumers have identical
and homothetic preferences defined over the two consumption goods; and, all markets are
perfectly competitive. Each country i possesses Li units of secure labor and Ki units of
secure land. However, departing from the HOS trade model, we assume there exists an
additional K0 units of land. (Of course, what we call land (K) could also be interpreted
as a natural resource (e.g., oil, water) or physical capital.) Although this additional land
is divisible, its division between the two countries is subject to dispute. Policymakers
use arming to gain control of the disputed resource, with the ultimate goal of maximizing
national welfare.
2.1 Introducing conflict
Let country i’s “guns” be denoted by Gi, a variable most accurately viewed as a producible
composite good that reflects country i’s military capability. Country i’s share of K0, then,
is determined by the following contest success function (or technology of conflict):
φi(Gi, Gj) =
{
f(Gi)
f(G1)+f(G2)
if
∑
i=1,2G
i > 0;
1
2 if
∑
i=1,2G
i = 0,
(1)
for i = 1, 2 (j 6= i), where f(·) ≥ 0, f(0) = 0, f ′(·) > 0, limGi→0 f ′(Gi) = ∞, and
f ′′(·) ≤ 0.10 According to (1), the fraction of the disputed resource a country secures in
10In Appendix A we derive some useful properties of this specification. The condition that
limGi→0 f
′(Gi) = ∞ and the assumed concavity of f(·) help establish existence and uniqueness of equi-
6
the contest depends on its own guns as well as those of its adversary. Specifically, it is
increasing in the country’s own guns (φi
Gi
≡ ∂φi/∂Gi > 0) and decreasing in the guns
of its adversary (φi
Gj
≡ ∂φi/∂Gj < 0, j 6= i). The influence of guns on a country’s share,
φi(Gi, Gj), could be taken literally or viewed as the reduced form of a bargaining process, in
which relative arming plays a central role in the division of the contested resource.11 In any
case, each country has an incentive to produce guns, whereby it can obtain a larger share
of the contested land and thus more income. But, there is an opportunity cost of doing
so—namely, the loss in income due to the diversion of resources away from the production
of consumption goods. This trade-off, which is trade-regime dependent, plays an important
role in the determination of the countries’ security policies.12
The setting here is an anarchic one, so that writing enforceable (binding) contracts on
the proliferation of arms and the division of K0 is not possible. Instead, we view guns as
the “enforcement” variable that determines each country’s share of the contested resource,
which in turn can be combined with the country’s remaining secure endowments of labor
and land to produce consumption goods. Accordingly, the sequence of events is as follows:
(i) Given the initial distribution of secure factor endowments (Li and Ki), the two coun-
tries (i = 1, 2) simultaneously choose their production of guns Gi.
(ii) Once these choices are made, the contested land is divided according to (1): each
country i receives φiK0 units of the contested resource.
(iii) With the quantities of land and labor left for the production of consumption goods
having thus been determined, private production and consumption decisions take
place. Under autarky, prices adjust to clear domestic markets. Under free trade, the
prices of consumption goods are fixed in the world market.
librium in the interior of the strategy space (see Theorem A.1 in Appendix A and its proof in Appendix
B). Skaperdas (1996) axiomatizes (1), requiring only that f(·) is a non-negative, increasing function. One
functional form for f(·) that has been widely used in the rent-seeking literature, as well as in the literatures
on tournaments and conflict, is f(G) = Gγ where γ ∈ (0, 1] (Tullock, 1980). See Hirshleifer (1989) for a
comparison of the properties of this form with those of f(G) = eγG. As noted below, employing alternative
specifications for φi(Gi, Gj) that allow for either non-additivity or asymmetry would not change the results
to follow. For a more general analysis of the comparative static results of conflict, see Acemoglu and Jensen
(2013).
11See Anbarci et al. (2002) for an analysis of this issue and how, in particular, different bargaining solution
concepts lead to division rules that vary in their sensitivity to guns.
12While countries often build their own militaries, they can, in practice, also buy or sell certain weapons
in the world market, as well as hire mercenaries or foreign security experts. The analysis could easily be
extended to allow for the international trade of guns. In particular, viewing “guns” as a composite good
produced according to a linearly homogeneous function with weapons and soldiers as its arguments, the
link between product (and arms) prices and factor prices would remain, so that our main insights would go
through. However, to highlight how pure trade in goods affects arming incentives, we abstract from such
possibilities in this analysis.
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A conflictual equilibrium is the Nash equilibrium in guns, conditional on the prevailing
trade regime.
To complete the basic model, we now specify the supply and demand sides of each
economy.
2.2 Production
Starting with the supply side, let ψi ≡ ψ(wi, ri) and cij ≡ cj(wi, ri) represent respectively
the unit cost functions of guns and goods j = 1, 2 in country i, where wi and ri denote
competitively determined factor prices—respectively, the wage paid to labor and the rental
rate paid to landowners. These unit cost functions have the usual properties, including
concavity and linear homogeneity in factor prices. By Shephard’s lemma, the unit land and
labor requirements in arms production are given respectively by ψir ≡ ∂ψi/∂ri > 0 and
ψiw ≡ ∂ψi/∂wi > 0. Similarly, aiKj ≡ ∂cij/∂ri > 0 and aiLj ≡ ∂cij/∂wi > 0 represent the
unit land and labor requirements in producing good j. Therefore, the land-labor ratio in
guns is kiG ≡ ψir/ψiw, and the corresponding ratio in industry j is kij ≡ aiKj/aiLj . Industry
2 is land intensive if ki2 > k
i
1 (or labor intensive if k
i
2 < k
i
1) at all relevant factor prices. We
follow much of the literature based on the HOS trade model in ruling out factor intensity
reversals.
Taking good 1 as the numeraire, let pi denote the relative price of good 2 in country i.
Perfect competition requires zero profits, or assuming diversification in production,
c1(w
i, ri) = aiL1w
i + aiK1r
i = 1 (2)
c2(w
i, ri) = aiL2w
i + aiK2r
i = pi, (3)
for i = 1, 2. These equations, together with the assumption of identical technologies across
countries and the properties of unit cost functions, imply that the wage-rental ratio, ωi ≡
wi/ri, can be written as a function of the relative price (i.e., ωi = ω(pi)). By the Stolper-
Samuelson (1941) theorem, a rise in pi increases the return to that factor which is used
intensively in the production of good 2, and at the same time decreases the return to the
other factor: ωip(≡ ∂ω/∂pi) ≶ 0 as ki2 ≷ ki1 (see Lemma A.1(a) in Appendix A).
Let (KiX , L
i
X) denote the vector of residual quantities of resources left for the production
of consumption goods in country i at the end of stage (ii), once labor and land resources
have already been employed in the production of guns Gi, respectively ψiwG
i and ψirG
i,
and the distribution of the contested resource has been realized, φiK0. Furthermore, let
Xij denote country i’s output of good j. Then, factor-market clearing and diversification in
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production require in each country i,
aiK1X
i
1 + a
i
K2X
i
2 = K
i
X (≡ Ki + φiK0 − ψirGi) (4)
aiL1X
i
1 + a
i
L2X
i
2 = L
i
X (≡ Li − ψiwGi). (5)
Now, let kiX denote country i’s residual land-labor ratio:
kiX ≡
KiX
LiX
=
Ki + φiK0 − ψirGi
Li − ψiwGi
, for i = 1, 2. (6)
Then, it is straightforward to verify, from (4) and (5) along with the linear homogeneity
of unit cost functions and the fact that ωi = ω(pi), that the relative supply of good 2
(oil), RSi ≡ Xi2/Xi1, can be written as RSi = RS(pi, kiX). Lemma A.1(b) in Appendix A
shows that the relative supply of good 2 is increasing in its relative price, due to increasing
opportunity costs: ∂RSi/∂pi > 0. In addition, Lemma A.1(c) establishes, consistent with
the Rybczynski (1955) theorem, that an exogenous increase in the residual land-labor ratio
causes an increase in the relative supply of the good that uses land intensively: ∂RSi/∂kiX ≷
0 as ki2 ≷ ki1. Of course, as can be seen from (6), the residual land-labor ratio itself is
endogenously determined, and can be written as a function of the relative price of good
2, the guns produced by the two countries, and resource endowments. To avoid cluttering
of notation, we write this function as kiX = k
i
X(p
i, Gi, Gj). Lemma A.2 in Appendix A
describes the dependence of kiX on its arguments. At this point, it is only important to
recognize the implication that the relative supply of good 2 can also be written as a function
of the price and guns: RSi = RS(pi, Gi, Gj). In the next section, we characterize the exact
nature of this relationship, as needed in the identification of market-clearing prices and in
the analysis of conflict under autarky.
2.3 Payoffs
Turning to the demand side, let Ri denote net national income and µi ≡ µ(pi) denote the
marginal utility of income. Country i’s indirect utility (aggregate welfare) function can then
be written as13
V i ≡ V i(pi, Gi, Gj) = µ(pi)Ri(pi,KiX , LiX), for i = 1, 2 (j 6= i). (7)
Equation (7) implicitly assumes that policymakers finance the cost of arming with nondis-
tortionary income taxes. This assumption, together with that of perfect competition, im-
plies that country i’s net national income (Ri) is the country’s maximized value of do-
13In this expression, we suppress the obvious dependence of V i on resource endowments to avoid cluttering.
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mestic production of consumption goods and, at the same time, the minimized value of
rental payments paid to residual labor and land owners. Then, equations (2)–(5) imply
Ri = Xi1 + p
iXi2 = r
iKiX + w
iLiX for i = 1, 2, which explains the arguments of R
i and V i
in (7). Ri should be identified with the familiar gross domestic product (GDP) or revenue
function (Dixit and Norman, 1980), excluding arms expenditures. As one can verify, Ri is
increasing and convex in pi, and the supply of good 2 satisfies Xi2 = R
i
p (≡ ∂Ri/∂pi), where
∂Xi2/∂p
i = Ripp ≥ 0.14
Using Roy’s identity, country i’s demand function for good 2 can be written as Di2 =
αiDR
i/pi, where the associated expenditure share is given by αiD ≡ αD(pi) = −piµip/µi
(> 0). Therefore, the excess demand for (or net imports of) good 2 is given byM i ≡ Di2−Xi2.
Then, holding fixed the secure resource endowments (Ki and Li) as well as the disputed
resource (K0), total differentiation of (7) yields
dV i = µ(pi)
[−M idpi + (riK0φiGi − ψi)dGi + riK0φiGjdGj] for i = 1, 2 (j 6= i). (8)
The first term inside the square brackets, weighted by the marginal utility of income µ(pi),
is a terms-of-trade effect. For net importers of good 2 (M i > 0), an increase in pi increases
the domestic cost of good 2, and is thus welfare-reducing. By contrast, a price increase is
welfare-improving for net exporters of good 2 (M i < 0).
The second term in the brackets (weighted by µ(pi)) captures the welfare effect of a
change in country i’s guns, Gi. Ceteris paribus, an increase in Gi increases country i’s share
of the contested land and thus its national income (the first term inside the parentheses).
At the same time, however, the increase in Gi draws additional resources away from the
production of consumption goods and thus reduces national income (the second term).
The third term in the brackets (again weighted by µ(pi)) captures the welfare effect of
a change in arms by country i’s opponent, Gj . An increase in Gj reduces country i’s share
of the contested resource and thus its income, and thereby adversely affects that country.
Note that, for fixed product prices, an equi-proportionate expansion of both countries’
guns, where G1 = G2 initially, implies no change in the division of the contested land, while
increasing the resource cost of guns, and thus necessarily leaves both countries worse off.
2.4 Incentives for arming
We now demonstrate how the above ideas inform the derivation of the optimizing security
policies (arming) under alternative trade regimes. A key feature of the optimization problem
for each country i’s arming choice Gi (given Gj) is that, with diversification in production,
14One can also show that Ri is increasing and concave in the residual factor inputs (KiX , L
i
X) and that
factor prices satisfy wi = RiL (≡ ∂Ri/∂LiX) and ri = RiK (≡ ∂Ri/∂KiX).
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the corresponding first-order condition (FOC), given by
∂V i(pi, Gi, Gj)
∂Gi
= µ(pi)ri
[
K0φ
i
Gi − ψi/ri
]
= 0 for i = 1, 2 (j 6= i), (9)
is the same in form regardless of the trade regime in place.15 Under autarky, domestic
product market clearing requires pi to adjust so that M i = 0. This requirement implies that
the first term inside the brackets in (8) vanishes, thereby yielding (9) as the relevant FOC.
Under free trade in consumption goods, product prices are invariant to security policies for
“small” countries; thus, the first term also vanishes under this trade regime.
Equation (9) shows that country i’s net marginal payoff from arming consists of two key
components: (i) the marginal benefit of producing guns, which is given by MBi ≡ K0φiGi
when measured in land units; and (ii) the marginal cost of producing guns, which is given
by MCi ≡ ψi/ri when measured in land units. Lemma A.3 in Appendix A characterizes
both of these components and thus of the net marginal payoff from arming, particularly
their dependence on arming by both countries and on the relative price.
For now, observe from the specification of the conflict technology (1)—and in particular
the assumed concavity of f(Gi)—that MBi is decreasing in i’s guns (Gi) given the guns
chosen by its rival (Gj), as illustrated in Fig. 1.16 Furthermore, MBi rises or falls with
Gj (i.e., MBi in Fig. 1 shifts up or down) depending on whether country i or j initially
produces more guns. But, since changes in the relative price pi (given Gi and Gj) have no
influence on MBi, the marginal benefit is independent of the trade regime in place.17
By contrast, MCi does depend on pi through factor prices. In particular, the linear
homogeneity of the unit cost function of guns (ψi = ψ(wi, ri)) implies that the marginal
cost of arming can be written as a function of the wage-rental ratio, ωi ≡ wi/ri: MCi =
ψi/ri = ψ(ωi, 1). Since the unit labor requirement in the production of guns (ψiw) is positive,
MCi is increasing in ωi. Accordingly, an increase in the price of the good that uses land
intensively, which by the Stolper-Samuelson theorem causes ωi to fall, results in a decrease
in the marginal cost of arming. Thus, MCi is decreasing in pi if good 2 is land intensive,
and otherwise is increasing in pi. But, either way, the mere influence of product prices
on MCi implies that the relationship between a country’s marginal cost and its arming is
15Our discussion here and to follow is based on the assumption that, under both trade regimes, the distri-
bution of factor endowments between the adversaries is such that their production of arms is not constrained
by their secure land holdings. We assume further that, under free trade, technology, the distribution of fac-
tor endowments, the quantity of the contested resource and the world price are such that production of
consumption goods is diversified.
16In addition, from equation (A.1a), the condition that limGi→0 f
′(Gi) =∞ implies limGi→0MBi =∞.
17To be sure, changes in pi influence the marginal benefit of arming, when measured in terms of the
numeraire good. Specifically, an increase in pi implies an increase in the value of the contested resource and
thus an increase in the marginal benefit of arming. However, since MBi and MCi represent respectively the
marginal benefit and cost of arming measured in land units, this effect is essentially subsumed in MCi.
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trade-regime dependent. Under free trade when production is diversified, the world price
alone determines the wage-rental ratio, ωi. Since ωi is invariant to changes in Gi, so is the
marginal cost of arming, as illustrated by MCiF (the dotted line) in Fig. 1. Under autarky,
a country’s product and factor prices are endogenously determined along with its choice
of guns. In the next section, we show that a country’s marginal cost of arming under this
regime is generally increasing in its own guns, as depicted by MCiA in Fig. 1.
3 Trade Regimes and Insecurity
Building on the results above, we now explore the implications of autarky and free trade
for arming. The central objective here is to characterize how the trade regime in place
influences arming incentives. We differentiate between trade regimes with subscripts “A”
for autarky and “F” for free trade.
3.1 Autarky
The first-order conditions in (9) show that, regardless of the trade regime in place, the two
countries’ optimizing choices for guns (Gi∗ for i = 1, 2) depend on the factor prices and
thus the product prices prevailing in the respective country, pi. Thus, to close the model we
need an additional condition, one for each country i, that determines the autarkic price, piA
(for i = 1, 2). These conditions require domestic markets to clear: M iA = 0 or equivalently,
RD
(
pi
)
= RS
(
pi, kiX
(
pi, Gi, Gj
))
for i = 1, 2, j 6= i, (10)
where RD(pi) denotes the relative demand for good 2. While the demand for good 2, as
noted above, is given by Di2 = α
i
DR
i/pi, the demand for good 1 is Di1 = (1 − αiD)Ri;
therefore, the relative demand for good 2 is RD(pi) ≡ Di2/Di1 = 1pi
αD(p
i)
1−αD(pi) . One can show
that RD(pi) is uniquely determined by and decreasing in the relative price of good 2, pi.
In addition, as noted above, the relative supply of good 2 (RSi) is increasing in pi.
Using (10), Lemma A.4 presented in Appendix A shows how the equilibrium price is
influenced by changes in the residual land-labor ratio (kiX) induced by exogenous changes
in guns and resource endowments. Most importantly for our purposes here, part (a) of the
lemma implies that a country’s marginal cost of arming under autarky, MCiA = ψ(ω(p
i
A), 1),
is increasing in the country’s own guns regardless of the ranking of factor intensities in the
consumption goods industries. The logic here is as follows. In the neighborhood of the
optimum implicitly defined by (9), an increase in Gi (given Gj) raises country i’s residual
land-labor ratio (see Lemma A.2(b)). By the Rybczynski theorem, this increase translates
into an increase in the relative supply of the good produced intensively with land, causing
the relative price of that good to fall—i.e., ∂piA/∂k
i
X ≶ 0 as ki2 ≷ ki1. Whether good 2 or
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good 1 is produced intensively with land, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem implies, in turn,
that the resulting price adjustment will force the wage-rental ratio ωi to rise and thus induce
MCiA to rise with G
i, as Fig. 1 shows. Noting that an increase in the opponent’s arming Gj
(given Gi) decreases country i’s residual land-labor ratio, one can apply analogous reasoning
to part (b) of the lemma to establish that a country’s marginal cost of arming is negatively
related to the opponent’s arming.
Obviously, the intersection of MCiA with MB
i, such as at point A in Fig. 1, gives country
i’s best-response function under autarky, BiA(G
j). The shape of this function depends on
how both the marginal cost and marginal benefit functions are influenced by the rival’s
arming, Gj . Of course, as we have just seen, MCiA is negatively related to G
j , and MBi is
increasing in Gj when Gi > Gj and decreasing in Gj when Gi < Gj . Thus, as illustrated
with solid-line curves in Fig. 2, BiA(G
j) depends positively on Gj (reflecting strategic
complementarity) up to and beyond its point of intersection with the 45◦ line; however,
at some point beyond that intersection, the function can become negatively related to Gj
(reflecting strategic substitutability).
One can show, under fairly general circumstances, that an interior Nash equilibrium in
pure strategies (security policies) exists in the autarkic trade regime and that it is unique.18
The conflictual (Nash) equilibrium under autarky is depicted by the intersection of the two
countries’ best-response functions.19 One such equilibrium—a symmetric one—is point A
in Fig. 2, where B1A and B
2
A intersect along the 45
◦ line. Point A′ (where B1′A and B
2′
A
intersect) shows an asymmetric equilibrium.
Whether the autarkic equilibrium is symmetric or asymmetric depends on the technolo-
gies for producing consumption goods, the technology of conflict (1), the degree of resource
insecurity (institutions), and the size of the secure endowments of land and labor, as each
influences autarkic prices and thus the marginal cost of arming. To proceed, consider first
the benchmark case, where countries 1 and 2 have identical secure endowments. We dif-
ferentiate the resulting symmetric equilibrium values from others, by placing a tilde (∼)
over the associated variables. Since the countries are identical, they face identical arming
18See Theorem A.1 presented in Appendix A. As shown in the proof, which is presented in Appendix B,
uniqueness of equilibrium is ensured if either the technology for arms is not very land intensive or if the
inputs to arms are not very close complements. These conditions, which are sufficient but not necessary,
serve to limit the responsiveness of each contender’s security policy to the opponent’s guns choice. We
should add that the proof is based on the assumption that not all secure land supplies are absorbed into the
production of guns. Although this assumption is made for convenience and could be relaxed, we maintain it
for clarity. One sufficient condition that ensures it is satisfied is that the degree of land insecurity (i.e., the
fraction of contested land) is not too high. Another possible condition is that guns are produced with labor
only. (Note that, provided that both factors are essential to the production of consumption goods, labor
will never be fully absorbed in the production of guns in the autarkic regime.)
19Note that, because each country always has an incentive to produce a small (but positive) quantity of
arms when its rival produces none, (0, 0) is not a Nash equilibrium.
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incentives; therefore, Gi∗A = G˜
∗
A for i = 1, 2, with each country thus receiving one half of the
contested resource, K0. Not surprisingly, then, equilibrium product prices and thus factor
prices as well as the residual land-labor ratios are also the same across countries: pi∗A = p˜
∗
A,
ωi∗A = ω˜
∗
A and k
i∗
X = k˜
∗
X for each i.
For the analysis to follow, it is useful to distinguish between two distinct sets of secure
endowments of land and labor that differ in their predictions for the relative amounts of
arms the two countries produce under autarky: S0 denotes the set of secure endowment
distributions implying a symmetric solution such that G1∗A = G
2∗
A = G˜
∗
A, and Si denotes the
set of secure endowment distributions implying an asymmetric outcome such that Gi∗A > G
j∗
A
(j 6= i). Clearly, S0 includes the benchmark case where the two countries have identical
secure endowments. The next lemma establishes that S0 includes other distributions as well,
and it characterizes equilibrium prices and the residual land-labor ratios for distributions
in both S0 and Si.
Lemma 1 (Arming and Autarkic Prices) Under autarky, there exists a non-empty set of
asymmetric factor distributions under which contending states face identical market-clearing
prices, produce identical quantities of arms, and are equally powerful. All other asymmetric
distributions generate different prices and unequal arming and power. Specifically, for each
country i = 1, 2 (j 6= i),
(a) Gi∗A = G˜
∗
A and p
i∗
A = p˜
∗
A for secure factor distributions in S0, where ki∗X = k˜∗X ;
(b) Gi∗A > G
j∗
A and p
i∗
A ≷ p
j∗
A as k
i
2 ≷ ki1 for secure factor distributions in Si, where
ki∗X < k
j∗
X .
To see what other distributions, aside from the symmetric one, yield the symmetric
outcome, suppose that, starting from the benchmark case, both land and labor resources
are transferred from country 2 to country 1, such that
dkiX
kiX
∣∣
dGi=dpi=0
= dK
i
KiX
− dLi
LiX
= 0, which
requires dK
i
dLi
=
KiX
LiX
= k˜∗X for each i. By construction, such a redistribution of resources, for
constant guns and prices, leaves the value of country i’s residual land-labor ratios unchanged
at kiX = k˜
∗
X , i = 1, 2. Thus, the countries’ relative supply and relative demand functions
do not shift; and, there is no pressure for autarkic prices to change. But, given prices do,
in fact, remain fixed at p˜∗A, arming incentives remain unchanged in both countries. Thus,
S0 consists of all secure resource distributions implying the same residual land-labor ratio
as that for two identical countries, k1∗X = k
2∗
X = k˜
∗
X . They all imply the same symmetric
outcome.20
20Notice that the logic of this experiment remains intact for numerous conflict technologies, including
those that permit non-additivity but maintain symmetry and some that permit asymmetry such as that
axiomatized by Clark and Riis (1998): φ1(G1, G2) = ϕf(G1)/[ϕf(G1) + (1 − ϕ)f(G2)] and φ2(G1, G2) =
1 − φ1(G1, G2), where ϕ ∈ (0, 1). In the presence of a more general sort of asymmetry, guns need not be
equalized even when secure endowments are identical, but their values will not change from the benchmark
case with transfers of secure land and labor that imply kiX = k˜
∗
X .
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To see how S0 differs from Si, the set of secure resource endowments implying an
asymmetric outcome such that G∗iA > G
j∗
A , consider an initial secure resource distribution
in S0. For such a distribution, the conflictual equilibrium is initially on the 45◦ line of Fig.
2, at point A, where B1A and B
2
A intersect. Now arbitrarily transfer labor from country 2 to
country 1, implying that country 1’s residual land-labor ratio falls, while that of country 2
rises. Thus, the price of the good produced intensively with land rises in country 1 and falls
in country 2. To fix ideas, suppose good 2 is produced intensively with land (i.e., ki2 > k
i
1).
Then, the transfer of labor to country 1 increases p1A, which in turn decreases its wage-rental
ratio and thus its marginal cost of arming; at the same, country 2’s loss of labor reduces p2A,
and thus increases its marginal cost of arming. In this case, since the marginal benefit of
arming is independent of the price, country 1 will behave more aggressively, while country
2 will behave less aggressively, as shown in Fig. 2 by the clockwise rotation of B1A to B
1′
A
and that of B2A to B
2′
A . The uniqueness of equilibrium ensures that the intersection of the
new best response functions, B1
′
A and B
2′
A , lies below the 45
◦ line, such as point A′ in the
figure, where clearly country 1 arms more heavily than its adversary. As confirmed in the
proof to Lemma 1 (presented in Appendix A), this effect on the countries’ arming incentives
holds regardless of the ranking of factor intensities of the two consumption goods. But, this
ranking does matter for the ranking of their autarkic prices. Specifically, as suggested by
the discussion above, the autarkic price of the good produced intensively with land is higher
in the more aggressive country—that is, G1∗ > G2∗ implies p1∗A > p
2∗
A when k
i
2 > k
i
1 and
p1∗A < p
2∗
A when k
i
2 < k
i
1.
21 This difference in autarkic prices across countries i = 1, 2 allows
us to distinguish further S1 from S0. Recall that, for distributions of secure endowments in
S0, k1∗X = k2∗X = k˜∗X . By contrast, since the equilibrium price of the good that is produced
intensively with land is decreasing in the residual land-labor ratio, we have k1∗X < k
2∗
X for
distributions in S1 regardless of the ranking of factor intensities across industries.22
3.2 Free trade
Turning to trade, we suppose the contending countries are “small” in world markets and,
for now, that there are no trade costs. Letting pi denote the international price of the non-
numeraire good, free trade in consumption goods requires pi = pi, for i = 1, 2. Since pi is
given by world markets and is thus independent of national security policies, a country’s
payoff function can be identified with its indirect utility function, V i, as shown in (7) where
pi = pi. Depending on fundamentals, the degree of land insecurity, and the international
price level, it is possible, as in the case of autarky, for arms production to be constrained by
21See Lemma A.5 in Appendix A for a formal proof of these equilibrium relationships.
22See Lemma A.4. For distributions in S1 adjacent to S0, we have k1∗X < k˜∗X < k2∗X , as implied by the
proof of Lemma A.6 in Appendix A.
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the countries’ secure land holdings.23 However, it is also possible now for one or both coun-
tries to specialize completely in the production of one consumption good. But, to highlight
the factor-price effects of opening borders up to free trade and the striking implications this
can have for arming incentives, we abstract from these two possible complications.
One can show that when (i) free trade in consumption goods leads to international
factor price equalization, and (ii) the production of arms does not exhaust either country’s
secure land endowment, an interior pure-strategy, Nash equilibrium in security policies
exists; furthermore, this equilibrium is unique and symmetric.24 Here we focus on the logic
underlying the symmetric feature of the free-trade equilibrium.
Suppose, to start, that the two countries have identical secure resource endowments,
and that the world price equals the equilibrium price that would obtain in each country if
there were no trade: pi = p˜∗A. Provided conditions (i) and (ii) stated above are satisfied, the
intersection of MBi and MCiF (as illustrated in Fig. 1 at point A) determines country i’s
best-response under free trade, BiF (G
j ; p˜∗A). Since product and thus factor prices are inde-
pendent of either country’s security policy in this trade regime, the shapes of best-response
functions are determined solely by the properties of the conflict technology (1), φi—that is,
∂BiF /∂G
j = −V i
GiGj
/V i
GiGi
= −φi
GiGj
/φi
GiGi
≷ 0 when Gi ≷ Gj .25 Thus, as illustrated in
Fig. 2, the best-response functions under free trade are upward-sloping (reflecting strategic
complementarity) up to their point of intersection with the 45◦ line, and downward sloping
(reflecting strategic substitutability) thereafter. When the two contending countries hold
identical endowments of secure resources, they face identical marginal benefit and marginal
cost functions for guns, thereby yielding the symmetric equilibrium, point A in Figure 2
where Gi∗F = G
j∗
F = G
∗
F and since pi = p˜
∗
A, G
∗
F = G˜
∗
A.
26
What about when secure endowments are unevenly distributed across the two countries?
Provided that the distribution is such that free trade in consumption goods implies inter-
national factor price equalization27 and such that the production of guns does not exhaust
23As in the case of autarky, countries will not use their entire labor endowments in the production of guns,
provided that both factors are essential in the production of consumption goods.
24See Theorem A.2 in Appendix A. The proofs of existence and uniqueness of equilibrium are similar
to those presented for the case of autarky (see Appendix B). To be sure, existence and uniqueness of
equilibrium arise under less restrictive conditions than (i) and (ii). However, relaxing these two conditions
only complicates the analysis without altering the key insights of our comparison of conflict under autarky
and free trade.
25To verify these inequalities, see equations (A.1c) and (A.1d).
26As before, the point (0, 0) is not an equilibrium (see footnote 19).
27The conditions for international factor price equalization include, as in the standard HOS trade model,
constant returns to scale in production, the absence of factor intensity reversals, identical technologies across
countries, diversification in production, absence of market failures or distortions, no trade barriers, and the
existence of at least as many productive factors in the tradable goods sectors as there are traded goods
(Samuelson, 1949). For distributions of secure resources where these conditions are not satisfied, at least
one country will specialize in the production of one consumption good. Such specialization precludes the
possibility of international factor price equalization and renders a country’s marginal cost of producing guns
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either country’s secure land resources,28 the contending states will continue to face identical
marginal benefit and marginal cost functions for guns, thus again yielding the symmetric
Nash equilibrium: Gi∗F = G˜
∗
A for i = 1, 2 when pi = p˜
∗
A. We label this set of distributions
the “arms equalization set” (AES). Under free trade given pi = p˜∗A, redistributions of secure
endowments across the two contending countries within the AES have no effect on their
arming.29 We note that, while the sets S0, S1, and S2 are defined under autarky and thus
are independent of the world price, the AES subsets of S0, S1, and S2 for which free trade
leads to arms equalization are not: as pi moves away from p˜∗A, these subsets shrink.
We now turn to explore the implications of changes in international prices for arming.
To proceed, note that, given the allocation of secure resources, there exists a range of prices
(pii, pii) for each country i that ensures diversification in the production of consumption
goods for that country. Then, for world prices pi ∈ (pi, pi), where pi = max{pi1, pi2} and
pi = min{pi1, pi2}, production is diversified in both countries. By contrast, for world prices
pi /∈ (pi, pi), where pi ≡ min{pi1, pi2} ≤ pi and pi ≡ max{pi1, pi2} ≥ pi, both countries specialize
in production.30 Using these definitions, we have the following:
Lemma 2 (Arming and International Prices) Assume that secure land endowments are
not exhausted in the production of guns. Then,
(a) equilibrium guns are increasing in the world price of the land-intensive good for world
prices pi ∈ (pi, pi) (i.e., dGi∗F /dpi ≷ 0 ∀pi ∈ (pi, pi) if ki2 ≷ ki1, for i = 1, 2); and,
(b) equilibrium guns are invariant to price changes for all world prices pi /∈ (pi, pi) (i.e.,
dGi∗F /dpi = 0, ∀pi /∈ (pi, pi)).
The proof of this lemma is fairly straightforward. Suppose once again that good 2 is
land intensive (ki2 > k
i
1). If the conditions specified in part (a) are satisfied, factor prices
and arms are equalized across countries. Now, let the world price of good 2 (pi) rise.
While this price change has no effect on either country’s marginal benefit of arming (MBi),
by the Stolper-Samuelson theorem the wage-rental ratio in each contending country will
fall; and, as previously discussed, this adjustment in factor prices will cause each country
independent of the world price, but increasing in its arms.
28Even where one country’s secure land constraint binds in the production of guns, free trade in con-
sumption goods can nonetheless lead to factor price equalization. Once the disputed land is divided, both
countries diversify in their production of the two goods. However, due to the binding resource constraint,
the marginal benefit of producing more arms is not equalized across countries. Accordingly, free trade does
not lead to arms equalization in this case, and more generally factor price equalization alone need not imply
arms equalization.
29These findings would remain unchanged assuming alternative specifications for the conflict technology
as described earlier in footnote 20.
30Of course, for identical adversaries, pi = pi and pi = pi. But, for adversaries having different secure factor
endowments, there also exist price ranges for which one country’s gun choices depend on prices while the
other country’s do not—namely, (pi, pi) and (pi, pi). However, these complications are not relevant for our
arguments.
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i’s marginal cost of arming (MCiF ) to fall, thereby inducing both to arm more heavily.
(Analogous reasoning establishes that, when good 1 is land intensive (ki1 > k
i
2), an increase
in pi ∈ (pi, pi) will induce less arming.) Turning to part (b), note that, from equations (2)–(5),
price changes outside the relevant range for country i, pi /∈ (pii, pii), force all factor prices to
rise proportionately in that country and thus have no effect on the marginal cost of arming.
Part (b), then, follows from the condition imposed implying both countries specialize in
production. But, for our purposes, the important point is that changes in world prices can
induce changes in the two contending countries’ arming choices.
Although the qualitative nature of the link between the relative world price of good
2 and the countries’ arming choices in the free-trade equilibrium depends on technology
(and in particular the relative factor intensities of the production of goods 1 and 2), for
simplicity and clarity we henceforth maintain the assumption that good 2 is land intensive—
i.e., ki2 > k
i
1. Unless otherwise noted, the results that follow remain intact regardless of the
ranking of factor intensities.
4 Trade Patterns and Trade Volumes
Naturally, the direction of a country’s trade flows depends on the world price. To ex-
plore this issue, define piiA as the level of the world price that eliminates country i’s trade:
M i∗F (pi) ≶ 0 if pi ≷ piiA.31 In what follows, we contribute two ideas to the literature. First,
we illustrate that international contestation of resources alters a country’s trade-eliminating
price relative to the case of no conflict and can thus affect its observed comparative advan-
tage. Second, we show that such conflict can drive a wedge between a country’s autarkic
price and trade-eliminating price under free trade such that a simple comparison of inter-
national and autarkic prices need not provide an accurate prediction of trade patterns in
contending countries.
To flesh out the effects of conflict on a contending country’s comparative advantage,
consider the case of identical adversaries. In this case, the trade-eliminating price in each
country coincides with the autarkic price: piiA = p˜
∗
A for i = 1, 2. As such, under conflict and
trade, both adversaries export the land-intensive good (j = 2) if pi > p˜∗A and import it if
pi < p˜∗A. Even so, this trade-eliminating price differs from that in the hypothetical case of
31As in the neoclassical version of this setting with no insecurity, the negative influence of the world price
pi on each country’s excess demand M i∗F (pi) follows from what is effectively a condition for stability of general
equilibrium under free trade. However, when there is insecurity, one has to account for the indirect influence
of a change in pi on the country’s residual land-labor ratio kiX , through its effect on arming by both countries.
The presence of insecurity, then, makes the condition for stability slightly more complicated. Interestingly,
this condition is identical to a sufficient condition for uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium under autarky
(see equation (B.13) and the surrounding discussion in Appendix B). Intuitively, this makes sense, since
prices under autarky change to clear domestic markets and policymakers take that effect into account when
choosing their guns.
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no arming, where from equation (1) with G1 = G2 = 0, each adversary continues to receive
1
2 of the contested resource K0. Denote this price by p
n
A. (The superscript “n” stands for
“no conflict” or “Nirvana.”) Thus, in the absence of conflict, the representative country
would export the land-intensive good if pi > pnA and would import it if pi < p
n
A.
The effect of conflict on the identical countries’ trade patterns ultimately stems from
the production of guns it induces and the resulting effect on the countries’ relative residual
factor endowments of land and labor that, in turn, influences their autarkic price relative
that which would emerge under no conflict. As revealed in the next proposition (shown in
Appendix A), this effect depends qualitatively on the land-labor ratio in the production of
guns kG(ω) = ψr/ψw relative to the land-labor ratio k = (K +
1
2K0)/L for i = 1, 2:
Proposition 1 (Trade Patterns with Identical Adversaries) Conflict over land reverses
the contending countries’ comparative advantage for pi ∈ (p˜∗A, pnA) if k > kG(ω), or for
pi ∈ (pnA, p˜∗A) if k < kG(ω), as compared with what would be observed in the hypothetical
case of no conflict.
For example, when guns production is sufficiently labor intensive (i.e., kG(ω) < k), an
exogenous and equal increase in guns by the two countries absorbs more secure land and
labor, but relatively more labor, thereby decreasing the autarkic price of the good produced
intensively with land; accordingly, pnA > p˜
∗
A holds. Now suppose pi ∈ (p˜∗A, pnA). Obviously,
since pi < pnA, under no conflict both countries would import good 2. But, since pi > p˜
∗
A
at the same time, under conflict each country exports good 2. Although the nature of the
distortion of conflict on trade patterns of identical countries also depends on the relative
ranking of factor intensities in industries j = 1, 2, the result that such a distortion can
emerge does not.32
This analysis suggests further that viewing international conflict over productive re-
sources as a type of trade cost that necessarily reduces the size of a contending country’s
trade flows might be inappropriate. If, for example, pi = pnA, then in the absence of conflict
the countries would not engage in trade. But, in the presence of conflict as we have just
seen, the contending countries will be net exporters (importers) of the land-intensive good
if ki > kiG(ω) (k
i < kiG(ω)). Of course, if pi = p˜
∗
A, then the two countries in conflict would
not engage in trade, whereas in the hypothetical case of no conflict the two countries would
engage in trade. Thus, depending on the world price, international conflict can either ex-
pand or shrink trade volumes.33 In any case, one can show more generally that conflict,
32This result is reminiscent of Brander and Taylor’s (1997b) finding that, over time, the depletion of a
common-pool resource in a country with ill-defined property rights can reverse its comparative advantage.
In our setting, residual factor endowments (and thus comparative advantage) can change simply due to the
dissipation of secure resources in conflict.
33The relationship between the volume of trade and conflict has been addressed empirically in the political
science literature (e.g., Barbieri, 2002), finding support for the idea that conflict might stimulate trade.
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through its absorption of secure resources in the production of guns, induces each country
to export (import) the land-intensive good by more than in the hypothetical case of no
conflict, if guns production is sufficiently labor (land) intensive.34
Moving on to the second main point of this section, neoclassical trade theory tells us that
a country’s trade pattern can be identified by comparing the world price to its autarkic price.
However, the distortion resulting from the absorption of secure resources in the production
of guns is trade-regime dependent. This dependence means that, in the world of insecure
property and international conflict, a country’s trade-eliminating price under free trade need
not coincide with its autarkic price. As a result, an unqualified application of the standard
logic normally used in trade theory can lead to erroneous inferences about trade patterns.
Now, it should be clear from our earlier discussion in Section 3.2 that, when the (uneven)
distribution of secure resources lies in the AES subset of S0, the trade-eliminating price for
each country does coincide with the autarkic price: piiA = p˜
∗
A. That is to say, a shift to free
trade with pi = p˜∗A induces no changes in the contenders’ factor prices and thus no change
in their arming. Therefore, the standard logic does apply: if pi ≷ p˜∗A, then M i∗F (pi) ≶ 0.
Matters differ, however, when the distribution falls in the AES subset of Si, i = 1 or 2, as
established in the next proposition:
Proposition 2 (Trade Patterns with Nonidentical Adversaries) For uneven secure factor
endowments in the AES subset of S0, piiA = p˜∗A holds, as in the neoclassical trade theory.
But, for distributions in the AES subset of Si assuming world prices in the neighborhoods of
pi∗A and p
j∗
A , pi
i
A 6= pi∗A holds almost always, and pijA < pj∗A holds always, such that comparing
the international price to a contending country’s autarkic price need not give an accurate
prediction of that country’s trade pattern.
Suppose that the distribution of secure resources lies in the AES subset of S1. As shown
in Appendix A, the introduction of free trade with pi = p2∗A (< p
1∗
A ) alters factor prices in
country 1, and thus arming incentives in both countries. The adjustment in arms by both
countries increases country 2’s residual land-labor ratio to reduce that country’s trade-
eliminating price relative to its autarkic price. Thus, when pi ∈ (pi2A, p2∗A ), the country
that is less aggressive in the autarkic equilibrium (i = 2) exports good 2 under free trade,
whereas neoclassical theory predicts that it imports the good. Similar reasoning shows that
country 1’s trade eliminating price almost always differs from its autarkic price, and under
most circumstances would be greater.
Clearly, if equilibrium arming were independent of the trade regime, the trade elimi-
nating price and the autarkic price would be the same. But, for an uneven distribution
of secure endowments across the two countries in the AES subset of Si, the trade regime
does influence arming and thus influences each country’s excess demand function to drive a
34See Proposition A.1 in Appendix A.
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wedge between these two prices. Accordingly, the direction of trade flows is not determined
by how the international price differs from the country’s autarkic price, pi∗A , but rather how
it differs from its trade-eliminating price, piiA.
5 Welfare Comparison of Trade Regimes
In this section, we show that a move from autarky to free trade need not be welfare im-
proving. The analysis not only further clarifies how international conflict generates a trade-
regime dependent distortion (Bhagwati, 1971), but also sheds light on the conditions under
which free trade intensifies this distortion.
To start, consider the welfare decomposition in (8) where pi = pi. With the envelope
theorem, it implies
dV i∗F
dpi
= µ(pi)
[
−M i∗F + r(pi)K0φiGj
dGj∗F (pi)
dpi
]
, for i = 1, 2 and j 6= i. (11)
The first term inside the brackets, weighted by the marginal utility of income (µ(pi)), cap-
tures the direct welfare effect of a price change, and its sign is determined by the country’s
trade pattern. It is positive for net exporters of the non-numeraire good (M i∗F < 0), and
negative for net importers (M i∗F > 0). The second term (again weighted by µ(pi)) captures
the strategic welfare effect of a price change. Specifically, by Lemma 2(a) under the main-
tained assumption that ki2 > k
i
1, when production is diversified an increase in pi induces
the opponent to increase its guns (Gj), which (given Gi) reduces the share of the disputed
land secured by country i. Therefore, this indirect effect on country i’s welfare is negative.
But, by Lemma 2(b), an increase in pi above pi or a decrease in pi below pi leaves arming un-
changed, and so the strategic effect vanishes. The next lemma, shown formally in Appendix
A, builds on these ideas:
Lemma 3 (International Prices and Welfare) A contending country i’s welfare is
(a) decreasing in the world price of the good that employs intensively the contested re-
source (land), in the neighborhood of pi = piiA (i.e., dV
i∗
F (pi
i
A)/dpi < 0);
(b) increasing in the world price of the good that employs intensively the contested re-
source (land) for pi > pi; and,
(c) minimized at a world price, pi = piimin(> pi
i
A).
Part (a) implies that, if the country exports the land-intensive product and pi does not differ
considerably from its trade eliminating price piiA, then an improvement in a contending
country’s terms of trade is necessarily “immiserizing.” Specifically, in the neighborhood
of piiA, the direct, positive effect of a terms-of-trade improvement on country i’s income
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(the first term in (11)) is swamped by the loss in income due to its opponent’s increased
aggressiveness (the second term in (11)). However, part (b) indicates that, when the world
price becomes sufficiently large to induce specialization in production by both countries
(pi > pi such that ∂GiF /∂pi = 0), this latter effect vanishes, leaving only the direct (positive)
welfare effect of the terms-of-trade improvement. Finally, part (c) indicates that a country’s
welfare is minimized at some price, piimin > pi
i
A, where the beneficial, direct effect of a terms
of trade improvement equals the adverse strategic effect that results from increased arms
production by the rival country.
Thus, there exists a range of world prices, pi ∈ (piiA, piimin), for which international conflict
over resources can expose contending countries with an apparent comparative advantage in
the contested-resource-intensive products to the “resource curse” problem. Others have
attributed the problem to domestic rent-seeking (e.g., Torvik, 2002; Mehlum et al., 2006),
redistributive politics (e.g., Robinson et al., 2006), and domestic conflict (e.g., Garfinkel
et al., 2008; Dal Bo and Dal Bo, 2011). But, our finding suggests that the absence or
ineffectiveness of international institutions aimed at managing international conflict has a
bearing on this problem as well.
Although country size is inconsequential in the determination of the quantity of guns
that adversaries produce under free trade for secure factor endowments in the AES, country
size does matter for the determination of the range of international prices for which the
resource curse problem arises. Consider, for example, an uneven distribution of secure
resources in the AES subset of S0, where country 1 holds larger endowments of both secure
labor and secure land than country 2 and where initially pi = piiA = p˜
∗
A. The strategic
welfare effect of an increase in pi above p˜∗A (the second term in (11)) will not differ across
adversaries. However, the marginal benefit from such a price increase (the first term in
(11)) will differ. Since, by construction, country 1 is larger than country 2, country 1 will
be relatively more involved in trade than its rival (i.e., −M1∗F > −M2∗F > 0) for pi > p˜∗A,
which implies pi1min < pi
2
min. Accordingly, for uneven factor distributions in S0, the relatively
smaller adversary (i = 2 in our example) will experience the resource curse problem over a
larger range of international prices.
To proceed with our comparison of welfare across the two trade regimes, we consider
two possibilities: (i) when adversaries are identical, which unveils the gist of the argument
and the circumstances under which autarky dominates trade; and, (ii) when adversaries
have different endowment profiles, which sheds some light on the conditions under which
national preferences over trade regimes can diverge.
Whether secure resources are identically distributed across the two countries or not,
the welfare decomposition in equation (11) suggests that there are two forces at play in
determining the relative appeal of free trade, both of which depend on the world price: (i)
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the gains from trade and (ii) the costs of insecurity. Starting with the gains from trade
as predicted by the neoclassical theory, a country’s welfare given guns increases with the
deviation of the world price from its autarky level pi∗A (Lemma A.3(d)). Given our focus
here on identical adversaries, the gains are equal to zero when the world price pi equals p˜∗A,
and increasing as pi moves away from that price. If the countries’ incentive to arm were
independent of the world price, then as the neoclassical theory predicts a shift to free trade
with pi 6= p˜∗A would unambiguously be welfare improving.
However, since each country’s incentive to arm does change with the world price, so
do the costs of insecurity. Let G∗(pi) denote the equilibrium quantity of guns under free
trade, as implicitly defined by (9), when the two adversaries are identical. By Lemma 2(a)
under the maintained assumption that good 2 is produced intensively with land, G∗(pi) is
increasing in pi for pi ∈ (pi, pi). Since equal increases in arms do not alter the division of
the contested land but do increase the resource costs of insecurity, these costs are strictly
increasing in pi over that range. Thus, for pi > p˜∗A, a discrete move from autarky to free
trade intensifies the conflict between the two countries, inducing more arming, and thus
larger security costs. By contrast, for pi < p˜∗A, a move to free trade from autarky weakens
the conflict, inducing less arming and thus smaller security costs.35
Now, when pi = p˜∗A, security costs are strictly positive, but the same across the two
trade regimes: G˜∗A = G˜
∗
F = G
∗(p˜∗A) > 0. Furthermore, since p˜
∗
A coincides with the trade-
eliminating price, the gains from trade are equal to zero when pi = p˜∗A. Hence, welfare is
the same across the two trade regimes: V ∗F (p˜
∗
A) = V˜
∗
A. The next proposition goes further to
show how the familiar gains from trade and the costs of insecurity combined determine the
relative appeal of free trade for other world prices:
Proposition 3 (Relative Appeal of Free Trade with Identical Adversaries) If free trade in
consumption goods induces adversaries with identical endowment profiles to
(a) import the land-intensive good, there will be less arming under free trade than under
autarky, and free trade will Pareto dominate autarky;
(b) export the land-intensive good, then the adversaries will arm more heavily under free
trade than under autarky, and free trade will be Pareto dominated by autarky for a
certain range of international prices close enough to the autarkic price.
For world prices pi < p˜∗A where countries import the land-intensive product, the gains from
trade reinforce the negative effect of trade on equilibrium costs of insecurity, such that free
35Note the difference between this result and that of Hirshleifer (1991), who explored the implications of
conflict over output, identifying market integration with the degree of complementarity between the inputs
in useful production. Specifically, he observed that the diversion of resources into arms falls with the degree
of market integration, although the size of this effect is small. Our approach suggests that, when conflict
is over resources and market integration takes the form of a move from more protected (autarky) to less
protected (free trade) trade regimes, the severity of conflict (measured by the level of arming) can rise or fall
depending on, among other things, technology, the degree of resource insecurity and international prices.
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trade is Pareto superior to autarky: V ∗F (pi) > V˜
∗
A. For pi > p˜
∗
A where the countries export
the land-intensive product, the gains from trade are positive, but the costs of insecurity
are larger. And, we know from Lemma 3(a), that the higher costs of insecurity swamp
the gains from trade in the neighborhood of pi = p˜∗A. Furthermore, by the continuity of
V ∗F (pi) in pi and Lemma 3, there exists a world price pi
′ that satisfies V ∗F (pi
′) = V˜ ∗A, where
the maintained assumption that good 2 is land intensive implies pi′ > pimin > p˜∗A. Thus, for
world prices pi ∈ (p˜∗A, pi′) such that each contestant exports the contested-resource-intensive
product, autarky will strictly dominate free trade: V˜ ∗A > V
∗
F (pi).
What is more, the characterization of preferences over the two extreme regimes of free
trade and autarky provided in Proposition 3 remains intact for continuous moves between
them. To see this, consider specifically the range of world prices for which autarky Pareto
dominates free trade: pi ∈ [p˜∗A, pi′]. Now suppose domestic (or internal) prices are pi =
p ∈ [p˜∗A, pi] for i = 1, 2. Any positive difference between world and domestic prices reflects
exogenous trade costs of the “iceberg” kind that effectively “melt” traded goods in transit.
In particular, for each unit of its exportable good shipped to the world market, a country
obtains a smaller quantity of its importable good. One obvious special case is free trade,
where there are no such costs and thus p = pi; another special case is where p = p˜∗A, implying
autarky. With the world price fixed, an increase in p < pi represents a decrease in trade
costs and thus a move towards freer trade.
Let Gi∗T denote the equilibrium quantity of guns country i produces in a trade-cost
distorted equilibrium. (The subscript “T” stands for “trade costs.”) With trade costs
exogenously given, product prices are independent of the countries’ security policies. Thus,
each country views the opportunity cost of producing guns in units of land (ψi/ri) as
constant, and equation (9) continues to implicitly define each country’s optimizing security
policy for interior solutions. In addition, since pi = p for i = 1, 2 by assumption, factor
prices in the two countries are identical and ψi/ri = ψ/r for i = 1, 2. Finally, note that,
given our maintained assumption that k2 > k1, this opportunity cost is decreasing in p.
Hence, domestic prices pin down gun choices: Gi∗T = G
∗
T (p) for i = 1, 2, with dG
∗
T /dp > 0
when initially p < p¯i so that production is diversified (see Lemma 2(a)). Accordingly, we
can write each country’s equilibrium payoff as V ∗T (p) ≡ V ∗T (p,G∗T (p), G∗T (p)) for i = 1, 2.
By now it should be clear that analyzing the welfare effects of changes in trade costs
in the presence of conflict over resources is roughly equivalent to analyzing the effects of
changes in world prices. An increase in p, where initially p ∈ [p˜∗A, pi), generates a terms-
of-trade effect that is generally non-negative and strictly positive for p > p˜∗A. However,
as just noted, such an increase in p where initially p < p¯i generates, at the same time, a
negative strategic effect as both countries increase their production of guns. The following
corollary, which follows from Lemma 3, characterizes the net welfare effect of an exogenous
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move towards freer trade:
Corollary 1 (Trade Costs and Welfare with Identical Adversaries) Consider domestic
prices p ∈ [p˜∗A, pi] where pi ∈ [p˜∗A, pi′], for which trade flows are not eliminated. Then,
(a) dV ∗T (p) /dp S 0 if p S pimin;
(b) V i∗T (p) < V˜
∗
A for all p ∈ (p˜∗A, pi′); and
(c) arg minp∈[p˜∗A,pi] V
i∗
T (p) =
{
pi if pi ∈ [p˜∗A, pimin) ;
pimin if pi ∈ [pimin, pi′].
Thus, a reduction in trade costs or a move towards freer trade by both countries can decrease
or increase their payoffs depending on whether p is initially less than or greater than pimin.
However, over the range of prices pi ∈ (p˜∗A, pi′), payoffs are strictly lower in the cost-distorted
trade equilibrium than in the autarkic equilibrium.36
Returning to the case where there are no trade costs, what about adversaries with
different endowment profiles? Arbitrary factor distributions in Si can complicate the welfare
ranking of autarky and free trade regimes for at least two reasons. First, because adversaries
begin to specialize in production at different international prices, it becomes necessary to
investigate arming incentives outside the AES for one country initially and eventually for
both. Second, the endogeneity of trade patterns together with the fact that V i∗F 6= V i∗A at
pi = pi∗A for arbitrary distributions in Si make it difficult to identify workable benchmarks for
comparison purposes. Still, as the next proposition illustrates, there exist two noteworthy
asymmetries that yield tractable comparisons.
Proposition 4 (Relative Appeal of Free Trade with Nonidentical Adversaries)
(a) For any uneven factor distribution in the AES subset of S0, there exists a range of
international prices that render autarky Pareto superior to free trade.
(b) If pi = p˜∗A, there exist subsets Di ⊆ Si of factor distributions adjacent to the AES
subset of S0 such that one country prefers autarky over free trade while its adversary
does not.
Part (a) extends Proposition 3 to uneven distributions in the AES subset of S0. Part (b)
clarifies how the countries’ preferences over trade regimes might differ when more general
factor endowment asymmetries are considered. As shown in the proof (presented in Ap-
pendix A), the divergence in preferences arises from the presence of a strategic welfare effect
when redistributing resources under autarky (Lemma A.6), and the absence of such an ef-
fect under free trade. It is possible to show further that, for world prices other than p˜∗A, at
36Of course, if pi > pi′, payoffs are strictly higher in the cost-distorted trade equilibrium with pi ∈ (pi′, pi)
than under autarky, and a reduction in trade costs unambiguously increases the countries’ payoffs further.
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least one country prefers autarky over free trade, and this preference could hold even for a
country that imports the good produced intensively with the contested resource.37
6 Strategic Considerations in the Choice of Trade Regimes: A Prisoners’
Dilemma Outcome
Our result above that autarky Pareto dominates free trade for a certain range of world
prices naturally raises the question of whether the countries would choose autarky or free
trade when such prices prevail. In exploring this issue, we focus on the case where the
two countries are identical and choose their trade regimes simultaneously and prior to the
first stage when they make their guns choices. Each country i’s choice induces a particular
relative price of good 2 for that country, given the trade regime chosen by the opponent j
and the implied relative price it faces, pj . So, for example, a choice of free trade by country
i implies that it faces a relative price of pi, whereas a choice of autarky implies a relative
price of piA(p
j). In what follows, then, we consider the possibility that the two countries face
different relative prices, and let V i(pi, pj) for i = 1, 2 and j 6= i denote the corresponding
payoff functions.
The implications of choosing one regime over the other for a country’s payoffs can be
decomposed into a terms-of-trade effect and a strategic effect according to equation (8)
with the envelope condition. A choice of free trade over autarky generally implies a non-
negative terms-of-trade effect (i.e., the familiar gains from trade). The strategic effect
works through the influence of a shift in trade regimes by country i (e.g., moving from
BiA(G
j) to BiF (G
j ;pi)) on opponent j’s guns choice: a positive response by country j gives
a negative strategic effect on country i’s payoff, and a negative response gives a positive
effect.38 To fix ideas, we maintain the assumption that good 2 is produced intensively
with the contested resource, and consider world prices that fall within the range implying
V ∗F (pi, pi) < V˜
∗
A = VF (pi
′, pi′)—namely, pi ∈ (p˜∗A, pi′).39
Focusing on the incentives for country 1, suppose for now that country 2 does not
engage in trade, and denote its market-clearing price by p2A. Then, country 1 has the
choice of trading freely at pi or remaining under autarky and so facing a relative price of
p1A(p
2
A) = p˜
∗
A. Thus, the relevant comparison of payoffs here is between V
1
F (pi, p
2
A(pi)) and
V˜ ∗A. Notice that at pi = p˜
∗
A, the two payoffs are equal.
37See Proposition A.2 in Appendix A.
38If instead each country were to choose its trade regime after having already produced its guns, then only
the terms-of-trade effect would matter, and as such both countries would necessarily choose free trade at
any world price. Of course, each country would anticipate this choice and arm accordingly in the first stage,
such that the welfare comparisons made in the previous section would continue to hold.
39Recall that pi′ was defined in the previous section as the world price, greater than pimin > p˜∗A, such that
V ∗F (pi
′, pi′) = V˜ ∗A holds. Note that it is possible to extend the analysis to consider world prices outside the
range (p˜∗A, pi
′). But, our interest here concerns the outcomes of the non-cooperative game of regime choices
when autarky Pareto dominates free trade.
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Now consider a small departure from the symmetric autarkic regime: pi = p˜∗A + ε for
very small ε > 0. Since the increase in the world price has no effect on outcomes when
both countries remain in autarky and the terms-of-trade effect associated with V 1F (pi, p
2
A(pi))
vanishes in the neighborhood of pi = p˜∗A, the difference in payoffs for country 1 in choosing
between the two regimes involves only the strategic effect that arises when country 1 chooses
free trade. In particular, the increase in pi induces country 1 to produce more guns given
the guns chosen by country 2 (a clockwise rotation of B1F (G
2;pi) in Fig. 2). The strategic
complementarity of country 2’s (stationary) best response function at the symmetric equi-
librium under autarky (i.e., ∂B2A(G
1)/∂G1 > 0 in Fig. 2 at point A), in turn, implies that
V 1F (pi, p
2
A(pi)) < V˜
∗
A for world prices just above the autarkic price, p˜
∗
A.
However, when pi is at the other end of the range of world prices under consideration,
matters differ. In particular, note that pi′ > p˜∗A implies p
2
A(pi
′) < pi′.40 As such, country
2’s guns are lower than when both countries trade freely at pi′, and the implied strategic
effect on country 1’s payoff means V 1F (pi
′, p2A(pi
′)) > V 1F (pi
′, pi′). But, because V 1F (pi
′, pi′) =
V˜ ∗A by the definition of pi
′, we have V 1F (pi
′, p2A(pi
′)) > V˜ ∗A. With these two results, the
continuity of the payoff functions implies that there exists a critical price, pi′′ < pi′, such
that V 1F (pi, p
2
A(pi)) > V˜
∗
A for all pi ∈ (pi′′, pi′]. In words, when country 2 chooses the autarkic
regime, country 1 strictly prefers free trade over autarky for all prices in this range. In
addition, assuming that pi′′ is unique, country 1 strictly prefers autarky over free trade for
world prices pi ∈ (p˜∗A, pi′′) given country 2 chooses autarky.
Next, suppose country 2 trades freely at pi > p˜∗A. In this case, country 1 effectively
chooses between the price under autarky p1A(pi) with a payoff of V
1
A(p
1
A(pi), pi) and the world
price pi under free trade with a payoff of V ∗F (pi, pi). Notice that at pi = p˜
∗
A, which implies
p1A(pi) = p˜
∗
A, we have V
1
A(p
1
A(pi), pi) = V
∗
F (pi, pi) = V˜
∗
A.
What happens as the world price rises above p˜∗A? When country 1 remains in autarky,
only the adverse strategic effect comes into play. Provided country 2 continues to diversify
in its production of the two consumption goods, this effect ensures that V 1A(p
1
A(pi), pi) is
decreasing in the world price. As such, we know that V 1A(p
1
A(pi), pi) < V˜
∗
A for pi > p˜
∗
A.
41 By
contrast, when country 1 trades freely, increases in the world price generate both a positive
terms-of-trade effect and a negative strategic effect on its payoff, V ∗F (pi, pi), as described
earlier in connection with Lemma 3. Nevertheless, as shown in Appendix A, we have the
following:
40To verify this, suppose that p2A(pi
′) = pi′, which implies that G1 = G2 = G∗(pi′), with both countries
exporting the land-intensive good, as in the free-trade regime when pi = pi′. To wipe out that excess supply
for country 2, its autarkic price must be lower than pi′. This line of reasoning can be applied to show that
p1A(pi) < pi for all pi > p˜
∗
A.
41Even if country 2 starts to specialize in production for some pi > p˜∗A, which implies that the negative
strategic effect on country 1’s payoff disappears, this implication holds.
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Lemma 4 V iA(p
i
A(pi), pi) < V
∗
F (pi, pi) for any pi ∈ (p˜∗A, pi′] and i = 1, 2.
Thus, despite the non-monotonicity of country 1’s payoff under free trade in world prices,
we know that, for the range of prices under consideration, country 1 prefers free trade over
autarky, given that country 2 trades freely with ROW.
Bringing this last result together with our earlier findings, while noting that the two
countries are identical so that their incentives over trade regimes are symmetric, gives us
the following:
Proposition 5 (Non-cooperative Choice of Trade Regimes by Identical Adversaries) For
all pi ∈ (p˜A, pi′), free trade is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the extended game that is
Pareto dominated by autarky. More precisely,
(a) when pi ∈ (p˜∗A, pi′′), there are two equilibria, one where both countries choose autarky
and the other where both choose free trade; and
(b) when pi ∈ (pi′′, pi′), the outcome where both countries choose free trade is the unique,
dominant-strategy equilibrium.
As part (b) of the proposition indicates, when the world price falls within the higher part
of the range of prices under consideration (i.e., pi ∈ (pi′′, pi′)), each country has an incentive
to choose free trade over autarky, regardless of what regime the other country chooses.
Although trade with higher world prices brings greater security costs, each country views
the gains from trade to be sufficiently large to swamp those costs regardless of the opponent’s
regime choice. Of course, as established in the previous section, when both countries choose
free trade at any world price within this range, the equilibrium security costs swamp the
gains from trade for each country. Thus, the non-cooperative choice of trade regimes can
result in a prisoners’ dilemma. Part (a) of the proposition indicates that, even when the
world price falls in the lower part of the range of prices under consideration (i.e., pi ∈
(p˜∗A, pi
′)), the same outcome where both countries choose free trade is possible, again despite
the Pareto dominance of the outcome where both choose autarky.
The results above, as summarized in Proposition 5, do not depend on our consider-
ation of only the two extreme trade policies of autarky and free trade. Indeed, one can
show that they remain intact when continuous trade policies (e.g., export taxes and sub-
sidies) are considered. In particular, it is possible to show that, for pi ∈ (p˜∗A, pi′) where
both countries export the land-intensive good and autarky Pareto dominates free trade, a
non-cooperative equilibrium has both countries choosing no trade intervention at all (i.e.,
free trade). For world prices sufficiently greater than p˜∗A but less than pi
′, this is the unique
equilibrium. Given that the two countries cannot coordinate their security policies, coor-
dination of their trade policies would be mutually beneficial, allowing them to internalize
28
the negative spillovers that operate through the security distortion. Specifically, they would
foreclose entirely on trade with ROW when pi ∈ (p˜∗A, pi′).42
It is important to notice that such coordination, even if it were possible, differs con-
siderably from the sort of cooperation often advocated in policy circles. Indeed, our result
contrasts sharply with much of the theoretical research on trade agreements that abstracts
from security costs and finds coordination of policy involves a reduction in tariffs relative
to the policies chosen non-cooperatively (see, for example, Bagwell and Staiger, 1999).43
In the setting of this model for a certain range of world prices, a concerted move by both
adversaries towards autarky would effectively weaken the severity of conflict between them
and prove to be mutually beneficial.
7 Concluding Remarks
In the decades leading up to World War I, the proportion of world trade to world GDP had
reached unprecedented magnitudes (O’Rourke and Williamson, 2000). Yet, international
conflict ensued with much ferocity and despite expectations to the contrary.44 Similarly, the
expansion of trade in the post World War II era has been spectacular. Still, while interstate
conflict might have subsided over this latter period, insecurity and contention continue to
flare up in many parts of the world. Whereas not all disputes can be considered to have
material causes, there is no doubt that contestation of water resources, land, oil, diamonds
and other resources by different countries has at least some role to play in many international
disputes and drives the military expenditures and security policies of the countries that are
involved in such disputes.
The extent to which disputed resources or the goods they produce are tradable can have
implications for the security policies that countries pursue and the costs those countries
realize as a result. At the same time, the presence of such conflict can have implications
for patterns of trade and welfare. We have explored these implications within the context
of the neoclassical trade model augmented by a disputed resource that is costly to contest,
considering two polar regimes: autarky and free trade. The key difference between these
regimes for small countries is that prices are endogenously determined under autarky but
not under free trade. As a consequence, arming incentives are trade-regime dependent.
The distortion in resource allocation caused by the presence of insecurity implies that a
42Details are available upon request from the authors.
43For a survey of the recent literature on trade agreements, including both theoretical and empirical
advances, see Maggi (2014). If countries were large, then the terms-of-trade externality emphasized in that
literature would be another relevant consideration in the design of jointly optimal trade policies.
44The prediction before World War I, for example, that war was impossible or unthinkable—because
Britain and Germany had become so economically interdependent that conflict was viewed as “commercial
suicide” (Angell, 1933)—was flatly contradicted by experience.
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country’s apparent comparative advantage can differ from its natural comparative advantage
(absent insecurity). In addition, comparisons of autarkic prices to world prices could be
inappropriate predictors of trade patterns. This latter finding suggests that empirical work
aiming to relate trade volumes to fundamentals would be incomplete if it did not include
insecurity and contestation of resources.
Furthermore, depending on the level of world prices, free trade in consumption goods
might intensify arming incentives to generate additional security costs that swamp the
traditional gains from trade and thus render autarky more desirable for one or both rival
states. Our analysis extended to consider the non-cooperative choice of trade regimes by
two identical states does not indicate, however, that both will necessarily choose autarky.
To the contrary, we find that, for a range of world prices, each state has a dominant strategy
to choose free trade even when the outcome is Pareto dominated by that which arises when
both choose autarky. For other world prices that continue to imply the Pareto dominance of
the outcome where both choose autarky, both symmetric outcomes are possible equilibria.
But, for world prices within either of these two ranges, if the two countries could coordinate
their regime choices (though not their security policies), they would jointly choose autarky,
whereby they could weaken the severity of the distortions induced by the presence of insecure
resources and thus obtain higher payoffs. Put differently, our analysis suggests that pushing
for free trade could be counterproductive when the fundamental source of the problem (i.e.,
resource insecurity) has not been resolved.
The basic model could be fruitfully extended in a number of ways. For example, the
analysis could assign an active role to the rest of the world. Furthermore, the analysis could
be generalized to situations where trade does not necessarily result in the equalization of
factor prices, and thus give a meaningful role to the possibility of trade in arms. In addition,
policy objectives could be specified to consider the role of politics. Last but not least, the
analysis could be extended to include the case of countries with monopoly/monopsony power
in world markets. Such an extension would allow one to explore not only the factor-price
channel through which trade openness matters for the allocation of resources—when some
of those resources are in dispute as emphasized here—but also the terms-of-trade channel
which arises in the case of large countries.45
Ultimately, solving the problem of insecurity entails the design and development of
commitment devices that can reduce, and possibly eliminate, the need to arm. Such com-
45As noted in the introduction, we are currently exploring this additional channel in a Ricardian setting
with a non-traded goods sector. Consistent with the results of the present paper, we find that trade openness
can induce more arming relative to the autarkic outcome and result in lower welfare. Although the particular
mechanisms at work in this alternative setting differ, their relevance for the welfare ranking of trade regimes
similarly depends on how they influence the gains from trade relative to the costs of insecurity. This setting
could also prove useful for exploring further the potential benefits of coordinated trade policies.
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mitment devices, however, are not easy to come by and, judging from particular historical
instances, they take a long time to develop. Europe is a good example of this. After the
experience of the two world wars, the original six members of the European Community
slowly began to develop mechanisms of economic integration that were, in large part, in-
stitutions of conflict management. This twin process of economic integration and conflict
resolution through bureaucratic and political struggle, instead of conflict in the battlefield,
is ongoing and far from complete, even after a century of tribulations. Trade openness and,
more generally, economic interdependence might help to ameliorate conflict, but it would
be naive to think that promoting such interdependence could achieve this by itself.
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A Appendix
This appendix includes many of the technical details of the analysis, including all lemmas,
propositions and theorems referred to in the text. Proofs of the results presented here but
not shown formally are presented in Appendix B, available online.
We first present several useful properties of the conflict technology in (1). For conve-
nience, define fi ≡ f(Gi), where from our previous assumptions f ′i > 0 and f ′′i ≤ 0. Now,
differentiate φi(Gi, Gj) with respect to its arguments, G
i and Gj for i = 1, 2 (j 6= i), to
obtain the following:
φiGi =
f ′ifj
(f1 + f2)2
> 0 (A.1a)
φiGj = −
f ′jfi
(f1 + f2)2
< 0 (A.1b)
φiGiGi =
fj
(f1 + f2)3
[f ′′i (f1 + f2)− 2(f ′i)2] < 0 (A.1c)
φiGiGj =
(fi − fj)f ′if ′j
(f1 + f2)3
≷ 0 if Gi ≷ Gj . (A.1d)
Lemma A.1 If production in a country is diversified (i.e., Xij > 0, for both countries
i = 1, 2 and both goods j = 1, 2), then
(a) ∂ω
i/∂pi
ωi/pi
≶ 0 if ki2 ≷ ki1;
(b) ∂RS
i/∂pi
RSi/pi
> 0;
(c)
∂RSi/∂kiX
RSi/kiX
≷ 0 if ki2 ≷ ki1.
In Lemma A.1 the residual land-labor ratio, kiX , is treated as exogenous. However, from
(6) it is clear that kiX depends on the prevailing relative price, guns, and factor supplies.
The next lemma clarifies this dependence.
Lemma A.2 Let ki ≡ Ki+φiK0
Li
and suppose the production of consumption goods is
diversified. Then kiX = k
i
X(p
i, Gi, Gj ;K0,K
i, Li) and
(a)
∂kiX
∂pi
≷ 0 if ki2 ≷ ki1;
(b)
∂kiX
∂Gi
> 0, ∀Gi that satisfy Ki0φiGi − ψi/ri + ε > 0, for some ε > 0;
(c)
∂kiX
∂Gj
< 0, ∀i 6= j;
(d)
∂kiX
∂Gi
+
∂kiX
∂Gj
≷ 0 if ki ≷ kiG whenever Gi = Gj , ∀i 6= j;
(e)
∂kiX
∂Li
< 0 and
∂kiX
∂K0
> 0,
∂kiX
∂Ki
> 0.
Lemma A.3 Each country i’s indirect utility function, V i, has the following properties:
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(a) V i
GiGi
< 0;
(b) V i
GiGj
≷ 0 if Gi ≷ Gj , j 6= i;
(c) V i
Gipi
≷ 0 if ki2 ≷ ki1 when evaluated at the value of Gi that solves V iGi = 0;
(d) V i is strictly quasi-convex in pi, and is minimized at the value of pi that solves M i = 0.
Lemma A.4 Under autarky, country i’s market clearing price of the non-numeraire good,
piA, and its residual land-labor ratio, k
i
X , are related as follows:
∂piA
∂kiX
≶ 0 if ki2 ≷ ki1.
We thus have for each country i = 1, 2
(a)
∂piA
∂Gi
≶ 0 if ki2 ≷ ki1, ∀Gi that satisfy V iGi + ε > 0, for some ε > 0;
(b)
∂piA
∂Gj
≷ 0 if ki2 ≷ ki1 (j 6= i);
(c)
(
ki2 − ki1
) (∂piA
∂Gi
+
∂piA
∂Gj
)
≶ 0 for Gi = Gj (j 6= i) if kiG ≶ ki ≡ K
i+φiK0
Li
;
(d)
∂piA
∂Li
≷ 0, ∂p
i
A
∂K0
≶ 0, and ∂p
i
A
∂Ki
≶ 0 if ki2 ≷ ki1.
Theorem A.1 An interior Nash equilibrium in pure strategies (security policies) exists
under autarky. Furthermore, the equilibrium is unique if the technology for arms is suffi-
ciently labor intensive or the inputs to arms are not very close complements.
Lemma A.5 Under autarky, equilibrium product prices and security policies satisfy the
following inequalities:
(ki2 − ki1)(p1∗A − p2∗A ) ≷ 0⇐⇒ G1∗A ≷ G2∗A .
Proof: In (9) we can use (A.1a) and the fact that MCi = ψi/ri = ψ(ω(pi), 1) to obtain
MB1
MB2
=
f ′(G1)/f(G1)
f ′(G2)/f(G2)
=
ψ(ω(p1), 1)
ψ(ω(p2), 1)
=
MC1
MC2
,
where for simplicity we have omitted stars. Now if ki2 > k
i
1, then by Lemma A.1(a),
ψ(ω(pi), 1) is decreasing in pi; therefore, if p1 ≷ p2, MC1/MC2 ≶ 1, which by the above
equation requires MB1/MB2 ≶ 1; in turn, the concavity of f(·) implies G1 ≷ G2. Alterna-
tively, if ki2 < k
i
1, ψ
i
ωω
i
p > 0 (Lemma A.1(a)), which implies MC
1/MC2 ≷ 1 if p1 ≷ p2. But
then MB1/MB2 ≷ 1 which requires G1 ≶ G2. ‖
Proof of Lemma 1. Since the logic behind part (a) was outlined in the main text, here we
prove part (b). A redistribution of a secure resource from country j to country i( 6= j) ex-
pands (contracts) the “recipient” (“donor”) country’s resource endowment. Differentiating
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country i’s FOC condition in (9) appropriately gives
∂2V iA
(∂Gi)2
dBiA +
∂2V iA
∂Gi∂H i
dH i = 0 =⇒ dB
i
A
dH i
= −∂
2V iA/∂G
i∂H i
∂2V iA/(∂G
i)2
,
for H = L,K. Since ∂2V iA/(∂G
i)2 < 0, we have sign[dBiA/dH
i] = sign[∂2V iA/∂G
i∂H i].
Differentiation of (9) yields
∂2V iA
∂Gi∂H i
=
[
V iGipi
]
pi=piA
dpiA
dH i
. (A.2)
From Lemma A.3(c) and Lemma A.4(d), it follows that, regardless of the ranking of ki1
and ki2, dB
i
A/dL
i > 0 whereas dBiA/dK
i < 0. The signs of these derivatives imply that a
transfer of labor from one country to another increases (decreases) arms production by the
recipient (donor) for any given arms choice by the rival; yet, a transfer of land decreases
(increases) arms production by the recipient (donor). By the properties of best-response
functions and in particular the uniqueness of equilibrium (shown in Appendix B), if we
start with an arbitrary secure endowment configuration in S0 and transfer a small amount
of labor from country j to country i or land from country i to country j, we necessarily
end up somewhere in Si where Gi∗A > Gj∗A . We must also have, by Lemma A.5 pi∗A ≷ pj∗A
if ki2 ≷ ki1, and by Lemma A.4 ki∗X < k
j∗
X . Notice that this proof does not require we
obtain complete comparative statics results on equilibrium arming and applies for all secure
resource allocations in Si. ‖
Lemma A.6 For initial factor distributions in S0, a small transfer of a secure resource
from country j to its adversary i (6= j) has the following implications for arming and welfare
under autarky:
(a)
dGi∗A
dLi
= −dG
j∗
A
dLi
> 0 but
dGi∗A
dKi
= −dG
j∗
A
dKi
< 0;
(b)
dV i∗A
dLi
= −dV
j∗
A
dLi
> µ(p˜∗A)w(p˜
∗
A) but
dV i∗A
dKi
= −dV
j∗
A
dKi
< µ(p˜∗A)r(p˜
∗
A).
Proof: To identify the effects of endowment changes on equilibrium security policies we
differentiate the FOCs in (9) and solve the resulting system of equations to obtain
(
dG1∗A
dG2∗A
)
=
1
|J |
 ∂2V 2A(∂G2)2 − ∂2V 1A∂G1∂G2
− ∂2V 2A
∂G2∂G1
∂2V 1A
(∂G1)2
( − ∂2V 1A∂G1∂H1dH1
− ∂2V 2A
∂G2∂H2
dH2
,
)
(A.3)
for H i = Li,Ki, where |J | > 0 denotes the determinant of the Jacobian of the net marginal
payoffs in (9)46 and where all expressions are evaluated at the equilibrium. Start with a
46See the proof of Theorem A.1 in Appendix B that shows |J | > 0.
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secure endowment distribution in S0, so that Gi∗A = G˜∗A and pi∗A = p˜∗A for i = 1, 2. At such
a distribution and prices, we have the following:
(i)
∂2V 1A
∂G1∂G2
=
∂2V 2A
∂G2∂G1
> 0 since by Lemma A.3(b), V 1G1G2 = V
2
G2G1 = 0 (see equation
(B.11) in Appendix B);
(ii)
∂2V 1A
(∂G1)2
=
∂2V 2A
(∂G2)2
< 0 by equation (B.10);
(iii)
∂B1A
∂G2
= −∂2V 1A/∂G1∂G2
∂2V 1A/(∂G
1)2
= −(φ1G2/φ1G1)Γ1A = Γ1A ∈ (0, 1) by equations (B.11) and (B.12)
and the related discussion in the proof of Theorem A.1 in Appendix B; and,
(iv)
∂2V 1A
∂G1∂L1
=
∂2V 2A
∂G2∂L2
> 0 whereas
∂2V 1A
∂G1∂K1
=
∂2V 2A
∂G2∂K2
< 0 by equation (A.2) and the
related discussion.
Part (a): Consider a small transfer of labor from country 2 to country 1, so that −dL2 =
dL1 > 0. Using the above observations with (A.3) yields
dG1∗A
dL1
= −dG
2∗
A
dL1
=
(+)
1
|J |
(+)[
− ∂
2V 1A
(∂G1)2
] (+)(
1− ∂B
1
A
∂G2
) (+)(
∂2V 1A
∂G1∂L1
)
> 0.
Similar logic for land redistributions shows that dG1∗A /dK
1 = −dG2∗A /dK1 < 0.
Part (b): Extend the decomposition of welfare effects in (8) to include the effect of changes
in the countries’ secure holdings of resources. Focusing on labor redistributions, invoking
the envelope theorem and using the fact that M i = 0 under autarky yield
dV i∗A
dLi
= µ(pi∗A)
[
w(pi∗A ) + r(p
i∗
A )K0φ
i
Gj
dGj∗A
dLi
]
for i = 1, 2 (j 6= i), (A.4)
where pi∗A = p˜
∗
A for initial distributions in S0. Then, part (b) of the lemma is established by
invoking symmetry and applying part (a) of the lemma to (A.4) and an analogous expression
for the welfare effects of a change in land. ‖
Theorem A.2 Suppose the world price, technology, the distribution of secure endow-
ments and the degree of land insecurity are such that (i) free trade in consumption goods
leads to international factor price equalization, and (ii) the production of arms does not
exhaust either country’s secure land endowment. Then, an interior Nash equilibrium in
pure strategies exists under free trade, and is unique and symmetric.
Proof of Proposition 1. Let pA(G) denote each (identical) country’s autarkic price as it
depends on their common quantity of guns, G. Then, pA(G˜
∗
A) = p˜
∗
A holds, and this price
coincides with each country’s trade-eliminating price: piiA = p˜
∗
A for i = 1, 2. Therefore,
M∗F (pi) ≷ 0 as pi ≶ p˜∗A. In the hypothetical case of no arming, which from equation (1)
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implies φi = φj = 12 , pA(0) = p
n
A holds, and M
n
F (pi) ≷ 0 as pi ≶ pnA. Then, the proposition
follows from Lemma A.4(c), which establishes that p′A(G) ≶ 0 (and thus pnA ≷ p˜∗A) as
kiG(ω) ≶ ki =
Ki+ 1
2
K0
Li
when ki2 > k
i
1. When k
i
1 > k
i
2, the inequalities are reversed. ‖
Proposition A.1 In the case of identical countries, conflict imparts a positive bias, relative
to the hypothetical case of no conflict, on each country’s tendency to export (import) the
good produced intensively with land if guns production is sufficiently labor (land) intensive.
For the next lemma, which proves useful in characterizing trade patterns for uneven
distributions of secure resources, let θiLG ≡ wiψiw/ψi denote the cost share of labor in the
production of guns in country i and let siK ≡ riKiX/Ri and siL ≡ wiLiX/Ri denote country
i’s land and labor shares respectively in total net income Ri.
Lemma A.7 A country’s residual land-labor ratio, kiX = k
i
X
(
pi,BiF (G
j), Gj ; ·), will change
as follows along its free trade best-response function, BiF (G
j), for i 6= j:
k̂iX =
ψi
RisiKs
i
L
f ′jfi
fjf ′i
 φi − φj
2φi − f ′′i fi
f ′2i
 θiLG − siL
 dGj . (A.5)
(a) If Gi ≤ Gj, then dkiX/dGj |Gi=BiF (Gj) < 0;
(b) If Gi > Gj, then dkiX/dG
j |Gi=BiF (Gj) 6= 0 almost always.
Proof: Recall that, since free trade pins down product and, thus, factor prices, dBiF /dG
j =
−φi
GiGj
/φi
GiGi
. Furthermore, observe that country i’s FOC (9) implies (i) riK0φ
i
Gi
= ψi
and (ii) riK0φ
i
Gj
= ψiφi
Gj
/φi
Gi
. Then, these applications of (9) to (B.4)47 with (A.1a)–
(A.1d) and the simplified expression for dBiF /dG
j gives (A.5). Parts (a) and (b) of the
lemma follow from (A.5), noting that the coefficient outside the square brackets is positive.
Inspection of (A.5) shows further that dkiX/dG
j |Gi=BiF (Gj) < 0 not only where G
i ≤ Gj , but
also where Gi > Gj , provided that θiLG is not too large relative to s
i
L. Since the expression
in square brackets is most likely to be positive when φi = 1 which implies φj = 0 and when
f ′′i /f
′2
i = 0, a sufficient (but hardly necessary) condition for this derivative to be negative
even when Gi > Gj , is that θiLG < 2s
i
L. ‖
Proof of Proposition 2. The case where the uneven distribution of secure resources
falls in the AES subset of S0 follows from the analysis of section 3.2. Thus, consider a
distribution of secure resources in the AES subset of S1 associated with pi = p2∗A , where
country 1 is relatively more aggressive under autarky. By Lemma 1(b) with the maintained
assumption that ki2 > k
i
1, G
1∗
A > G
2∗
A implies p
1∗
A > p
2∗
A . Now consider a shift from autarky
to free trade for both countries, with pi = p2∗A . From (9), the introduction of free trade alone
47See the proof of Lemma A.2 in Appendix B.
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gives country 2 no incentive to adjust its guns choice. However, since pi = p2∗A < p
1∗
A , a shift
to free trade induces country 1 to decrease its guns (G1); and, given the negative influence
of G1 on B2F (G
1) for G2 < G1, this adjustment in country 1’s guns choice, in turn, induces
country 2 to increase its guns until the free trade equilibrium, where arms are equalized, is
reached. From Lemma A.7(a), these adjustments in guns imply that country 2’s residual
land-labor ratio, k2X , necessarily increases. Then, from the Rybczynski theorem, country
2’s excess supply of good 2, when evaluated at the autarkic price, p2∗A , is strictly positive.
As such, the world price that eliminates country 2’s trade, pi2A, must be below the country’s
autarkic price, p2∗A . (Assuming instead that k
i
1 > k
i
2 implies pi
2
A > p
2∗
A .) Similar reasoning
with Lemma A.7(b) establishes that pi1A 6= p1∗A almost always. In particular, a move to
free trade with pi = p1∗A > p
2∗
A induces both countries to increase their arming and, these
adjustments have offsetting effects on country 1’s residual land-labor ratio (k1X). Thus, it
would be only by coincidence that pi1A = p
1∗
A . As indicated in the proof of Lemma A.7,
k1X tends to fall on net as both countries increase their arming, provided that country 1’s
cost share of labor in the production of guns (θ1LG = w
1ψ1w/ψ
1) is not too large relative to
country 1’s labor share in total net income (s1L = w
1L1X/R
1); a sufficient (but not necessary)
condition is that θ1LG < 2s
1
L (see equation (A.5)). Thus, it is possible that pi
1
A < p
1∗
A , but in
most circumstances pi1A > p
1∗
A . (If k
i
1 > k
i
2, then in most circumstances pi
1
A < p
1∗
A .) ‖
Proof of Lemma 3.
Part (a): The result follows from the definition of piiA (which implies M
i∗
F (pi
i
A) = 0) and the
observation that the strategic welfare effect—i.e., the second term in the RHS of (11)—is
negative (positive) when ki2 > k
i
1 (k
i
2 < k
i
1).
Part (b): By Lemma 2(b) when ki2 > k
i
1 (k
i
2 < k
i
1), there exists a sufficiently high (low)
price, pi > piiA (pi < pi
i
A)), such that dG
j∗
F /dpi = 0 ∀pi > pi (∀pi < pi). But then by (11) and
the definition of piiA, which implies M
i∗
F (pi) ≶ 0 for pi ≷ piiA, we must have that, if ki2 > ki1
(ki2 < k
i
1), then dV
i∗
F /dpi > 0 ∀pi ≥ pi (dV i∗F /dpi < 0 ∀pi ≤ pi).
Part (c): By parts (a) and (b), there must exist a price, piimin ≷ piiA when ki2 ≷ ki1, that
minimizes country i’s welfare while country i exports the land-intensive good. ‖
Proof of Proposition 4. Since we consider secure factor distributions in the AES subset
of S0, it will necessarily be the case that pi∗A = p˜∗A for i = 1, 2, and thus piiA = p˜∗A. For
clarity, suppose that ki2 > k
i
1; however, keep in mind that analogous results obtain when
ki1 > k
i
2.
Part (a): By Lemma 3, there thus exists a price pii′ > piimin, for i = 1, 2, such that V
i∗
F (pi) <
V˜ i∗A , ∀pi ∈ (p˜∗A, pii′). Now define pi′ = min{pi1′, pi2′}. It follows that V i∗F (pi) < V˜ i∗A for i = 1, 2,
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∀pi ∈ (p˜∗A, pi′).
Part (b): Starting at an arbitrary distribution in the AES subset of S0, transfer a small
quantity of labor from country 2 to country 1 (i.e., −dL2 = dL1 > 0), so that the final
distribution is in the AES subset of S1. Since in the case of free trade the strategic effect of
such transfers vanishes (there is no effect on equilibrium arming), a welfare decomposition
similar to that in (A.4) yields dV 1∗F /dL
1 = −dV 2∗F /dL1 = µ(pi)w(pi). Thus, Lemma A.6(b)
implies that dV 1∗F /dL
1 < dV 1∗A /dL
1 and dV 2∗F /dL
1 > dV 2∗A /dL
1. Since pi = pi∗A implies
V i∗F = V
i∗
A initially, we will have V
1∗
F < V
1∗
A and V
2∗
F > V
2∗
A after the transfer. By
continuity, there exists additional labor transfers with the just described preferences over
trade regimes. ‖
Proposition A.2 For an asymmetric distribution of secure resources in the AES subset of
Si given world prices in the neighborhood of pi∗A , country i imports the land-intensive good
and is worse off under free trade.
Proof of Lemma 4. To fix ideas let us continue to focus on country 1’s incentives,
taking as given that country 2 trades freely with ROW. We now write country 1’s payoff
as V 1(p1, G1, G2) and analyze how this payoff changes as p1 increases from p1A(pi) to pi ∈
(p˜∗A, pi
′).48 The change in welfare identified in this exercise indicates how country 1’s payoff
changes when the country moves from autarky to free trade, given country 2 chooses free
trade. Our analysis proceeds in two steps, first tracing out the welfare consequences of the
change in the relative price faced by country 1 from p1A(pi) to pi given guns and then tracing
out the welfare consequences of the adjustment in guns given that both countries face the
world price pi.
Step 1: Fix G1 and G2 at their equilibrium values associated respectively with p1A(pi) and
pi—or equivalently G1∗A = B
1
A(G
2∗
F ) and G
2∗
F = B
2
F (G
1∗
A ;pi). Hence, our starting point is
the equilibrium outcome where country 2 trades freely with ROW and country 1 remains
in autarky. Given those equilibrium guns choices, now let p1 rise from p1A(pi) to pi. With
this price increase, country 1 becomes an exporter of the non-numeraire good. Given guns,
then, the increase in the price faced by country 1 implies an improvement in country 1’s
terms of trade and, consequently, a higher payoff.
Step 2: Next, fix the relative price faced by both countries at pi, and consider the adjustment
in guns by both countries from (G1∗A , G
2∗
F ) to (G
∗
F (pi), G
∗
F (pi)), the equilibrium guns choices
when both countries choose free trade. Note that along this path, the choice of guns by
each country rises, but G1 < B2F (G
1;pi) until the equilibrium where both trade freely (with
G1 = G2 = G∗F (pi)) is reached. Accordingly, given our finding from step 1, it suffices to
48Recall, as argued in footnote 40, p1A(pi) < pi when pi > p˜
∗
A.
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show that
dV 1(pi,G1, B2F (G
1;pi))
dG1
> 0,
when G1 < B2F (G
1;pi).
We assume, for ease of exposition only, that both countries diversify in production.49
Since p1 = pi, factor prices in the two countries are equalized (i.e., ri = r and wi = w for
i = 1, 2) and ψi = ψ. From equation (8) then, we have
dV 1(pi,G1, B2F (G
1, pi))
dG1
= µ(pi)
[
rK0φ
1
G1 − ψ + rK0φ1G2
∂B2F (G
1, pi)
∂G1
]
.
Noting that φ1G2 = −φ2G2 and ∂B2F /∂G1 = −φ2G2G1/φ2G2G2 while using country 2’s FOC for
its choice of guns (i.e., rK0φ
2
G2 = ψ), allows us to simplify the expression above as follows:
dV 1(pi,G1, B2F (G
1, pi))
dG1
= µ(pi)ψ
[
φ1G1
φ2
G2
− 1 + φ
2
G2G1
φ2
G2G2
]
. (A.6)
The first two terms in the square brackets combined reflect the direct, net marginal effect on
country 1’s payoff from increasing G1, whereas the last term reflects the indirect marginal
effect of an increase in G1 on country 1’s payoff through its effect on country 2’s guns choice.
Using the specification of the conflict technology in equation (1),50 these two components
can be written respectively as
φ1G1
φ2
G2
− 1 = f
′
1f2
f1f ′2
− 1 > 0 (A.7a)
φ2G2G1
φ2
G2G2
= −f
′
1f2
f1f ′2
[
2φ2 − 1
2φ2 − f2f ′′2 /(f ′2)2
]
< 0. (A.7b)
The inequalities above follow from our assumptions that (i) G1 < B2F (G
1, pi) implying that
φ2 > 12 and (ii) f
′′
i ≤ 0 implying that f ′i/fi is decreasing in Gi for i = 1, 2. Thus, (A.7a)
shows that the direct effect of an increase in G1 on country 1’s payoff is positive, while
(A.7b) shows that the indirect effect is negative.
As such, to characterize the welfare consequences of the adjustment in guns given the
relative price faced by country 1, we have to dig a little deeper. Specifically, we combine
49Relaxing this assumption would remove the adverse strategic effect of the increase in G1 through
B2F (G
1;pi) on V 1(pi,G1, B2F (G
1;pi)) from our calculations to follow. As such, it would follow immediately
that the derivative shown in the expression above is positive.
50Also see equations (A.1a)–(A.1d)
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(A.7a) with (A.7b) and simplify, while noting that 2φ2 − f2f ′′2 /(f ′2)2 > 0, to show
sign
{
φ1G1
φ2
G2
− 1 + φ
2
G2G1
φ2
G2G2
}
= sign
{[
f ′1f2
f1f ′2
− 1
] [
2φ2 − f2f ′′2 /(f ′2)2
]− f ′1f2
f1f ′2
[
2φ2 − 1]}
= sign
{[
f ′1f2
f1f ′2
− 2φ2
]
+
[
f ′1f2
f1f ′2
− 1
] [−f2f ′′2 /(f ′2)2]} . (A.8)
The second term inside the curly brackets in (A.8) is non-negative and is strictly positive
when f ′′i < 0. To confirm that the first term is strictly positive, we rewrite it as follows
f ′1f2
f1f ′2
− 2φ2 = f
′
1φ
2
f ′2φ1
− 2φ2 = φ
2
φ1
[(
f ′1
f ′2
− 1
)
+
(
1− 2φ1)] .
The first term in the square brackets is non-negative since f ′′i ≤ 0 and G1 < BF (G1, pi),
and the second term is strictly positive since G1 < BF (G
1, pi) implies that φ1 < 12 . Hence,
country 1’s welfare rises under step 2 as well as under step 1. The same sort of reasoning
can be applied to show that country 2 strictly prefers free trade with pi ∈ (p˜∗A, pi′] to autarky,
given that country 1 trades freely with ROW. ‖
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B Online Appendix for “Trade and Insecure Resources”
Proof of Lemma A.1: Following Jones (1965), we denote the shares of factor h = K,L in
the cost of producing good j = 1, 2 by θihj : θ
i
Kj = r
iaiKj/c
i
j and θ
i
Lj = w
iaiLj/c
i
j . Similarly,
θiKG ≡ riψir/ψi and θiLG ≡ wiψiw/ψi indicate the corresponding cost shares in guns. Now
denote the amount of land and labor employed in industry j = 1, 2 respectively by Kij
and Lij . Then, these quantities as a fraction of resources remaining once land and labor
for producing guns have been set aside are respectively indicated by λiKj ≡ Kij/KiX and
λiLj ≡ Lij/LiX . Finally, let a percentage change be indicated by a hat (ˆ) over the associated
variable (e.g., x̂ = dxx ).
Part (a): Noting that c1 = 1 and c2 = p, differentiation of (2) and (3) totally gives
∂ci1
∂wi
dwi +
∂ci1
∂ri
dri = 0 =⇒ aiL1
wi
ci1
dwi
wi
+ aiK1
ri
ci1
dri
ri
= 0
∂ci2
∂wi
dwi +
∂ci2
∂ri
dri = dpi =⇒ aiL2
wi
ci2
dwi
wi
+ aiK2
ri
ci2
dri
ri
=
dpi
pi
.
With the definitions given above, we can write this system of equations as(
θiL1 θ
i
K1
θiL2 θ
i
K2
)(
ŵi
r̂i
)
=
(
0
p̂i
)
. (B.1)
Now, since
∑
h=K,L θhj = 1 for j = 1, 2 by definition, the determinant of the coefficient
matrix above, denoted by
∣∣θi∣∣, can be written as
∣∣θi∣∣ ≡ θiK2 − θiK1 = θiL1 − θiL2 = ωi (ki2 − ki1)(ωi + ki1) (ωi + ki2) ≷ 0 if ki2 ≷ ki1.
Then, solving (B.1) for the pi-induced changes in factor prices yields
piwip
wi
= −θ
i
K1
|θi| and
pirip
ri
=
θiL1
|θi| . (B.2)
From (B.2), then, we have piωip/ω
i = piwip/w
i− pirip/ri = −1/|θi| ≶ 0 when ki2 ≷ ki1, which
completes the proof of part (a).
Parts (b) and (c): Note first that we can combine (4) and (5) to obtain λiL1k
i
1+λ
i
L2k
i
2 = k
i
X .
Then, following the strategy above in part (a), we differentiate (4) and (5) totally and solve
1
the resulting system of equations to obtain
X̂i1 =
1
|λi|
(
−λiL2K̂iX + λiK2L̂iX
)
− 1|λi| |θi|
(
λiL2δ
i
K + λ
i
K2δ
i
L
)
p̂i
X̂i2 =
1
|λi|
(
+λiL1K̂
i
X − λiK1L̂iX
)
+
1
|λi| |θi|
(
λiL1δ
i
K + λ
i
K1δ
i
L
)
p̂i,
where δiK ≡ λiK1θiL1σi1 + λiK2θiL2σi2 > 0 and δiL ≡ λiL1θiK1σi1 + λiL2θiK2σi2 > 0, with σij =
cij
∂2cij
∂wi∂ri
/
∂cij
∂wi
∂cij
∂ri
being the (absolute value of the) elasticity of substitution between land and
labor in industry j;
∣∣λi∣∣ denotes the determinant of the coefficient matrix obtained from
differentiating (4) and (5); recalling
∑
j=1,2 λ
i
hj = 1 for h = K,L, we have
∣∣λi∣∣ ≡ λiK2 − λiL2 = λiL1 − λiK1 = (ki2 − kiX) (kiX − ki1)kiX (ki2 − ki1) ≷ 0 if ki2 ≷ ki1.
Now, observe that k̂iX = K̂
i
X − L̂iX , which implies
R̂S
i
= X̂i2 − X̂i1 =
1
|λi| k̂
i
X +
δiK + δ
i
L
|λi| |θi| p̂
i. (B.3)
Inspection of (B.3) confirms parts (b) and (c). ‖
Proof of Lemma A.2: Denote country i’s land and labor shares in total net income
Ri by siK ≡ riKiX/Ri and siL ≡ wiLiX/Ri, and let σiG = ψiψiwr/ψiwψir be the (absolute
value of the) elasticity of substitution between land and labor in the guns sector. Total
differentiation of (6), using the linear homogeneity of ψi, yields
k̂iX =
[
ψiθiLGθ
i
KGσ
i
GG
i
|θi|RisiKsiL
]
p̂i +
ψi
RisiKs
i
L
[
risiL
ψi
(
K0φ
i
Gi −
ψi
ri
)
+ θiLG
]
dGi
+
riK0φ
i
Gj
RisiK
dGj +
φidK0
KiX
+
dKi
KiX
− dL
i
LiX
. (B.4)
Parts (a)–(c) & (e): The proofs follow from (B.4).
Part (d): Suppose Gi = Gj so that φi
Gi
= −φi
Gj
. Now use dGi = dGj in (B.4) to obtain
∂kiX/∂G
i
kiX
=
ψi
(
θiLG − siL
)
RisiKs
i
L
.
Using the definitions of θiLG, s
i
L, and R
i, along with those for KiX and L
i
X in (4) and (5),
2
tedious algebra verifies the following transformation of this relationship:
∂kiX/∂G
i
kiX
=
ψi
(
θiLG − siL
)
RisiKs
i
L
=
ψiw
(
kiX − kiG
)
KiX
=
ψiwL
i
(
ki − kiG
)
KiXL
i
X
. (B.5)
Inspection of this expression confirms part (d). ‖
Proof of Lemma A.3:
Part (a): Differentiate (9) with respect to Gi and use equation (A.1c) in Appendix A to
obtain
V iGiGi = µ
iriK0φ
i
GiGi < 0. (B.6)
Part (b): Differentiation of (9) with respect to Gj , using equation (A.1d), gives
V iGiGj = µ
iriK0φ
i
GiGj ≷ 0 if Gi ≷ Gj . (B.7)
Part (c): As noted in the text, ψi/ri = ψ(ωi, 1), implying that ∂(ψi/ri)/∂pi = ψiwω
i
p.
Then, differentiating (9) with respect to price and evaluating the resulting expression at
the optimum gives (by Lemma A.1(a))
V iGipi = −µiri
∂(ψi/ri)
∂pi
= −µi
(
ψi
pi
)(
wiψiw
ψi
)(
piωip
ωi
)
= µi
(
ψi
pi
)
θiLG
|θi| ≷ 0 if k
i
2 ≷ ki1. (B.8)
Part (d): This is a standard property of indirect (trade) utility functions, highlighting the
important idea that, for given guns, a country’s welfare is higher, the greater is the deviation
of product prices from their autarkic levels (Dixit and Norman, 1980). ‖
Proof of Lemma A.4: Let σiD > 0 be the elasticity of substitution in consumption.
Focusing on percentage changes, note that R̂D
i
= −σiDp̂i and that the expression for R̂S
i
is given in (B.3). Totally differentiating (10) and rearranging terms gives
R̂D
i
= R̂S
i
=⇒
(
σiD +
δiK + δ
i
L
|λi| |θi|
)
p̂i +
1
|λi| k̂
i
X = 0.
The above relation and the definitions of
∣∣θi∣∣ and ∣∣λi∣∣ reveal that pi is decreasing (increasing)
in kiX if k
i
2 > k
i
1 (k
i
2 < k
i
1). Combining the expression for kˆ
i
X in (B.4) with the above
3
expression gives
p̂iA = −
1
∆i |λi|
[
∂kiX/∂G
i
kiX
dGi +
∂kiX/∂G
j
kiX
dGj +
φidK0
KiX
+
dKi
KiX
− dL
i
LiX
]
, (B.9)
where ∆i ≡ σiD + δ
i
K+δ
i
L
|λi||θi| +
ψiθiLGθ
i
KGσ
i
G
|λi||θi|RisiKsiL
Gi > 0. The proofs to parts (a)–(d) now follow from
(B.9) and Lemma A.2 in Appendix A. ‖
Proof of Theorem A.1:
Existence: We establish existence of equilibrium in pure strategies, by showing that each
country i’s payoff function V iA is strictly quasi-concave in its strategy, G
i. To do so, it
is sufficient to show either that V iA is strictly monotonic in G
i or that V iA is first strictly
increasing and then strictly decreasing over the agent’s strategy space.
Let F (KiG, L
i
G) be the production function for guns that is dual to the unit cost func-
tion ψ(wi, ri) and define G
i ≡ F (Ki, Li) as the level of guns produced with the country’s
entire secure endowments of land and labor. Country i’s strategy space is [0, G
i
]. For
any Gj ∈ [0, Gj ], if Gi = Gi, country i (6= j) will not be able to produce either of the
consumption goods; therefore, V iA(G
i
, Gj) < V iA(G
i, Gj) for any Gi ∈ [0, Gi) which implies
that, under autarky, no country will use all of its resources to produce arms. Further-
more, since limGi→0 f ′(Gi) = ∞ by assumption, we must have ∂V iA/∂Gi > 0 as Gi → 0.
By the continuity of V iA in G
i, there will exist a best response function for each country
i, BiA(G
j) ≡ min{Gi ∈ (0, Gi) | ∂V iA/∂Gi = 0}, with the property that ∂V iA/∂Gi > 0
∀Gi < BiA(Gj). Thus, to establish strict quasi-concavity of V iA in Gi we need only to prove
that ∂V iA/∂G
i < 0, ∀Gi > BiA(Gj).
Suppose, to the contrary, that ∂V iA/∂G
i ≥ 0. Since V iA must eventually fall to V iA(G
i
, Gj),
this supposition implies that V iA must attain a local minimum at some G
i > Bi(Gj), which
would imply that ∂2V iA/(∂G
i)2 > 0. We now establish that this is not possible. Recalling
that piA = p
i
A(G
i, Gj) under autarky and that ωi = ω(pi), we differentiate (9) with respect
to Gi and apply (9) to the resulting expression to obtain1
∂2V iA
(∂Gi)2
=
(−)[
V iGiGi
]
pi=piA
+
(±)[
V iGipi
]
pi=piA
(∓)(
∂piA
∂Gi
)
< 0. (B.10)
By Lemma A.3(a), the first term in the RHS of the above expression is negative regardless of
the ranking of factor intensities. Furthermore, by Lemmas A.3(c) and A.4(b), the product
of the expressions in the second term will also be negative. It follows that ∂2V iA/(∂G
i)2 < 0
1In this expression and below, the top signs in “±” and “∓” apply when ki2 > ki1 and the bottom signs
apply when ki2 < k
i
1.
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at any Gi where ∂V iA/∂G
i = 0 regardless of the ranking of factor intensities. This proves
BiA(G
j) is unique and establishes the existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium.
Uniqueness: Having already established that guns production is bounded (i.e., BiA(G
j) ∈
(0, G
i
) for i = 1, 2 (j 6= i), we can now establish uniqueness of equilibrium by showing that,
at any equilibrium point, the determinant of the Jacobian of the net marginal payoffs in (9)
is positive—i.e., |J | = ∂2V 1A
(∂G1)2
∂2V 2A
(∂G2)2
− ∂2V 1A
∂G1∂G2
∂2V 2A
∂G2∂G1
> 0 (Kolstad and Mathiesen, 1987).
Consider an equilibrium point where G1∗A = B
1
A(G
2∗
A ) and G
2∗
A = B
1
A(G
1∗
A ). From the
expression for |J |, it can be seen that, if the product of the slopes of the two countries’
best response functions,
(
∂B1A/∂G
2
) (
∂B2A/∂G
1
)
, is less than 1 at (G1∗A , G
2∗
A ), then |J | > 0,
implying that this equilibrium is unique. The slope of country i’s best-response function
can be written as
∂BiA
∂Gj
= −∂
2V iA/∂G
i∂Gj
∂2V iA/(∂G
i)2
= −
[
V i
GiGj
]
pi=piA
+
(±)[
V i
Gipi
]
pi=piA
(±)(
∂piA
∂Gj
)
[
V i
GiGi
]
pi=piA
+
[
V i
Gipi
]
pi=piA
(
∂piA
∂Gi
) . (B.11)
Since ∂2V iA/(∂G
i)2 < 0 as shown in (B.10), the sign of ∂BiA/∂G
j is determined by the sign of
∂2V iA/∂G
i∂Gj shown in the numerator of (B.11). Now, by Lemmas A.3(c) and A.4(b), the
second term of the numerator of the RHS of this expression is always positive. By Lemma
A.3(b), the first term in the numerator is positive if BiA(G
j) > Gj (also see equation
(B.7)), in which case Gi is a strategic complement for Gj . However, if BiA(G
j) < Gj ,
then the first term is negative. Thus, when BiA(G
j) is sufficiently smaller than Gj , Gi can
become a strategic substitute for Gj . Furthermore, since φ1G1G2 = −φ2G2G1 (see (A.1d)),
it follows from (B.7) that sign
[
V 1G1G2
]
p1=p1A
= −sign [V 2G2G1]p2=p2A . Therefore, we have
two possibilities to consider. Either (i) ∂BiA/∂G
j > 0 and ∂BjA/∂G
i ≤ 0 for i = 1, 2
(j 6= i); or, (ii) ∂BiA/∂Gj > 0 for i = 1, 2 (j 6= i). It is easy to check that, in case (i),(
∂B1A/∂G
2
) (
∂B2A/∂G
1
)
< 1 and therefore |J | > 0. Turning to case (ii), we now establish
the existence of (sufficient) conditions that ensure
(
∂B1A/∂G
2
) (
∂B2A/∂G
1
)
< 1 and thus
|J | > 0.2
To proceed, use (B.4) and (B.9), applying (9), to obtain
∂piA
∂Gi
= − p
i
Aψ
iθiLG
∆i |λi|RisiKsiL
and
∂piA
∂Gj
=
piAψ
i
∆i |λi|RisiKsiL
(
−φ
i
Gj
φi
Gi
)
siL.
The above expressions together with (9), (B.6), (B.7), and (B.8) can be substituted into
2Note that, in case (ii), |J | > 0 is also the condition for local stability of equilibrium.
5
(B.11) to obtain ∂BiA/∂G
j = −(φi
Gj
/φi
Gi
)ΓiA, where
ΓiA =
[
−φ
i
GiGj
∆i
φi
Gj
+
ψiθiLGs
i
L
|λi| |θi|RisiKsiL
]/[
−φ
i
GiGi
∆i
φi
Gi
+
ψi(θiLG)
2
|λi| |θi|RisiKsiL
]
. (B.12)
From equations (A.1a) and (A.1b) in Appendix A, we have (φ1G2/φ
1
G1)(φ
2
G1/φ
2
G2) = 1,
implying
(
∂B1A/∂G
2
) · (∂B2A/∂G1) = Γ1AΓ2A; therefore, if ΓiA ∈ (0, 1) for i = 1, 2, then |J | >
0. In case (ii), both the numerator and the denominator of ΓiA are positive, so Γ
i
A > 0. Now
define ηi ≡ Gi[−φi
GiGi
/φi
Gi
+ φi
GiGj
/φi
Gj
]. From (A.1a)–(A.1d), ηi = Gi[f ′i/fi − f ′′i /f ′i ] > 0.
Then, subtracting the numerator of ΓiA from its denominator while using the definition of
∆i shown below (B.9) gives the following:
ηi
Gi
(
σiD +
δiK + δ
i
L
|λi| |θi|
)
+
ψiθiLG
|λi| |θi|RisiKsiL
(
θiLG + θ
i
KGσ
i
Gη
i − siL
)
. (B.13)
Clearly, a sufficient condition for ΓiA < 1 is that (B.13) is positive, which is almost always
true. In particular, since the first term and the coefficient in front of the second term
are unambiguously positive, a sufficient (but hardly necessary) condition for ΓiA < 1 is
θiLG + θ
i
KGσ
i
Gη
i− siL ≥ 0 or equivalently θiLG(1− siL) + θiKG(σiGηi− siL) ≥ 0. This condition
is satisfied under a wide range of circumstances,3 including: (i) σiGη
i ≥ siL, which requires
arms inputs not to be close complements; and (ii) θiLG ≥ siL (or, by (B.5), ki > kiG),
which requires the guns sector to be sufficiently labor intensive, regardless of the degree
of substitutability between inputs in arms. Either condition, along with the boundary
conditions established above, ensures uniqueness of equilibrium. ‖
Proof of Theorem A.2: The proofs for existence and uniqueness of equilibrium, which
build on parts (a) and (b) of Lemma A.3, are similar to (and simpler than) those in the
case of autarky (see the proof of Theorem A.1 above), and are thus omitted here. The main
text provides a discussion of the logic underlying the symmetry results. ‖
Proof of Proposition A.1: Under free trade with p = pi, each (identical) country’s excess
demand for good 2 is
M = D2 −X2 = D2(pi,R(pi,KX , LX))−Rpi(pi,KX , LX). (B.14)
The effect of conflict on a country’s imports and hence exports can be identified by dif-
ferentiating the expression above with respect to guns. (We thus move from Nirvana to
a situation of some conflict.) First, total differentiation of (B.14) keeping the world price
3If, for example, the production function for guns is Cobb-Douglas and the conflict technology takes the
Tullock form (i.e., f(Gi) = (Gi)γ , ∀γ ∈ (0, 1]), then σiG = 1 and ηi = 1, thus implying that the sufficient
condition simplifies to 1− siL ≥ 0, which is always satisfied.
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fixed yields
dM =
∂D2
∂Ri
[RKdKX +RLdLX ]−RpiKdKX −RpiLdLX . (B.15)
The first term in the RHS of the above expression is an income effect. Since our focus here is
on the case of identical countries, an increase in Gi would be matched by an equal increase
in Gj , and so would result in a decrease in income and thus a decrease in the demand for
good 2. The last two terms combined represent a production effect, as an increase in Gi
and an equal increase in Gj influence each country’s residual factor endowments.
To proceed, recall that D2 = αDR/p where αD ≡ −piµp/µ ∈ (0, 1) is each country’s
expenditure share on good 2. Under the assumption that the country trades freely so that
p = pi, these relationships imply ∂D2/∂R
i = αD/pi. Furthermore, by the properties of the
revenue function with p = pi, we have RK = r, RL = w, RpiK = RKpi = rpi and RpiL = wpi
for i = 1, 2. Assuming dGi = dGj = dG (which implies φi
Gi
= −φi
Gj
) and keeping in mind
that KX = K + φK0 − ψrG and LX = L− ψwG, equation (B.15) can be written as
dM =
[
1
pi
αD(−ψ) + (rpiψr + wpiψw)
]
dG. (B.16)
Next, recall from the proof of Lemma A.1(a), the definitions of the cost shares of land
and labor in the production of consumption goods j = 1, 2 and guns: θKj = raKj/cj and
θLj = waLj/cj , for j = 1, 2; and θKG ≡ rψr/ψ and θLG ≡ wψw/ψ. Then, tedious algebra
using equation (B.2) with pi = pi shows that equation (B.16) can be rewritten as follows:
dM =
ψ
pi|θ| [(1− αD)θL1 + αDθL2 − θLG] dG, (B.17)
where |θ| = θK2 − θK1 = θL1 − θL2 ≷ 0 as k2 ≷ k1. As shown in (B.17), the key in
determining the sign of dM is the sign of the term in brackets, which we denote by Λ:
Λ ≡ (1− αD)θL1 + αDθL2 − θLG.
We interpret Λ as reflecting the degree of land intensity of guns production. In particular,
if Λ < 0, then we say that guns production is sufficiently labor intensive; and if Λ > 0, then
we say that guns production is sufficiently land intensive.4
To fix ideas suppose that good 2 is produced intensively with land (k2 > k1), which
implies that |θ| > 0. In this case, if guns production is sufficiently labor intensive (Λ < 0),
then dM < 0, implying that there is a positive bias in the export of good 2 relative to
4One can show that these conditions, when evaluated in the autarkic equilibrium, are identical to requiring
respectively kG(ω) < k and kG(ω) > k.
7
the hypothetical case of no conflict.5 Alternatively, if guns production is sufficiently land
intensive (Λ > 0), then dM > 0, implying that there is a positive bias in the import of the
land-intensive good. ‖
Proof of Proposition A.2: Consider an allocation in the AES subset of S1, where G1∗A >
G2∗A and G
1∗
F = G
2∗
F assuming world prices in the neighborhood of p
1∗
A . Under the maintained
assumption that ki2 > k
i
1, p
1∗
A > p
2∗
A holds (see Lemma 1(b) in Appendix A). Now suppose,
just for the sake of argument, that both countries move to free trade, but face different world
prices: pi1 = p1∗A and pi
2 = p2∗A . The resulting outcome is simply the autarkic equilibrium.
To proceed, keep pi1 = p1∗A fixed, and suppose that pi
2 increases to pi1 = p1∗A . This increase
in pi2 induces country 2 to increase its arms, which in turn induces country 1 to increase its
arms. However, the increase in country 1’s arming will be proportionately less, so that in the
free trade equilibrium arming is equalized across countries: B2F (G
1
F ; p
1∗
A ) = B
1
F (G
2
F ; p
1∗
A ) >
G1∗A > G
2∗
A . Assuming that θ
1
LG is not too large relative to s
1
L so that dk
1
X/dG
2|G1=B1F (G2) <
0 (see equation (A.5)), pi1 = p1∗A < pi
1
A and hence country 1’s comparative advantage is
distorted in this equilibrium: M1F (p
1∗
A ) > 0.
Since a shift from autarky to free trade can be viewed as an exogenous change in the
effective price, the welfare effects of such a shift can generally be decomposed into the
terms-of-trade effect and the strategic welfare effect as shown in (11). Of course, pi1 has
not changed in this experiment, implying the terms-of-trade effect on country 1’s welfare is
zero. Thus, the effect of both countries’ moving from autarky to free trade on country 1’s
welfare at pi = p1∗A will be captured by the negative strategic welfare effect alone (i.e., the
second term in equation (11)) induced by the increase in pi2. (Note that, while driven solely
by the strategic welfare effect, this adverse consequence for country 1’s welfare reflects the
distortion in country 1’s comparative advantage at pi = p1∗A .)
A fall in the world price below p1∗A induces both a terms-of-trade improvement and a
positive strategic effect for country 1, and thus causes an increase in country 1’s welfare.
As such, there exists a world price less than p1∗A , for which country 1’s welfare under free
trade will be equal to that under autarky.
As pi rises above p1∗A approaching country 1’s trade eliminating price pi
1
A, both the terms
of trade effect and the strategic welfare effect for country 1 are negative. Further increases
in pi above pi1A continue to imply a negative strategic welfare effect, but now also a positive
terms-of-trade effect. Nevertheless, for pi sufficiently close to pi1A, the former effect will
dominate. ‖
5Note that if the representative country were to export good 2 in the hypothetical case of no conflict,
this bias would imply an expansion of the volume of trade under conflict. But, if the country were to import
good 2 in the case of no conflict, this bias means that the volume of trade shrinks in the presence of conflict.
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